← Breach analysis by the Dual Vulnerabilities framework

MySpace credential theft (Peace, 2013)

2013 · United States · J - Information and communication · Mass data theft of user credentials

Analysed 2026-11-06 by Hermes

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What happened

Mass data theft of user credentials

Dual vulnerability type

Expertise to Execution

Evidence coverage: 2/6 stages, weight 14/60

Decisive stage: egress (clearest evidence) · Alternative: Strategy to Execution

Why this classification

(1) MySpace, then owned by Time Inc., held login credentials for hundreds of millions of users; protecting customer passwords at rest with salted, modern hashing was a standard technical requirement of the sector, and the company itself adopted double-salted hashes when it relaunched the platform on 11 June 2013, which shows the remedy was known internally. (2) In practice, the credential store of the old (pre-June-2013) platform was never remediated: passwords remained unsalted SHA-1 hashes; that data had been stolen by 2013 and went entirely undetected until it was offered for sale in May 2016 (about 360 million accounts, 427 million passwords, asking 6 Bitcoin, roughly $2,800), and because the hashes were unsalted the thief and downstream buyers could recover the plaintext passwords at scale (an estimate of 98-99 percent cracked). The entry vector of the 2013 intrusion has never been disclosed and is not load-bearing for this classification. (3) The classification rests on the egress/data-protection stage: the expectation that was not acted on originated with technical specialists (a known hashing remedy the company itself later deployed - material origin), and the chain broke in operations and architecture, where the legacy credential store was simply never brought up to that standard (execution break) - a known remedy that existed and was even adopted elsewhere in the company but was never realised against the legacy data, which is the diagonal within-material-column pattern of Expertise to Execution rather than a strategy that failed to translate or leaders ignoring warnings. The detection gap (three-year undetected theft, discovered only via the attacker's marketplace listing) points to the same type but rests on thinner, inferred evidence; the post-discovery response (notification, forced invalidation, monitoring, law enforcement) shows no gap and is not coded. (4) RM26 (Expertise to Execution lens): password protection on the pre-2013 platform stayed at unsalted SHA-1 while the known remedy - salting, which MySpace itself deployed as double-salted hashing in the June 2013 relaunch - was never realised against the legacy credential store, amplifying the theft's impact because the stolen hashes were bulk-crackable (causal role: Amplifying). RM34 (Expertise to Execution lens): detection capability never surfaced the intrusion - Time Inc.'s own statement is that its security team became aware only when the stolen logins appeared for sale in a hacker forum, about three years after the data's cutoff, so whatever tooling and monitoring existed did not detect the activity (causal role: Obscuring).

Evidence by stage

Risk markers

Sources

Notes

Row description (360 million logins, sale for $2,800) matches the May 2016 marketplace listing and the stated victim MySpace; no data-quality mismatch. Attribution to 'Peace' is the victim's own belief ('We believe the data breach is attributed to Russian Cyberhacker Peace', via MySpace's 2016 blog statement as reported by The Hacker News/TechCrunch), not independently confirmed. The case file's source_url was malformed (trailing ' /'); the current Vice URL opened instead. Time Inc.'s own press release (businesswire, 31-05-2016) is dead at the original URL; the cited Wayback snapshot of it was opened during this task. LeakedSource's analysis (unsalted SHA-1, crack estimates, 427M figure) is cited only as reported by Motherboard/Vice and TechCrunch; LeakedSource itself is a paid stolen-data search engine and was not opened, per research boundaries. Year set to 2013, the year of the theft (data from accounts before the 11-06-2013 relaunch; MySpace confirmed it was hacked in 2013); public disclosure was May-June 2016. The theft vector is undisclosed in all sources reviewed. No related_rows in the case file. Link check: thehill.com blocks automated access (HTTP 403); the page was opened and read during research.