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Aimware Subscriber Database Breach (Unattributed, 2019)

2019 · Switzerland · J - Information and communication · Subscriber database theft and leak

Analysed 2026-11-07 by Hermes

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What happened

Subscriber database theft and leak

Dual vulnerability type

Expertise to Execution

Evidence coverage: 2/6 stages, weight 11/60

Decisive stage: egress (clearest evidence) · Alternative: Strategy to Leadership

Why this classification

(1) Aimware is a commercial subscription platform (operated by NETSHARK SAGL, Lugano, per its imprint) holding personal data for roughly 300,000 paying users, and its own published privacy policy promises to protect personal information by reasonable security safeguards against loss or theft as well as unauthorized access and disclosure. (2) In practice the subscriber database was stolen around 28 April 2019 and left the site apparently unnoticed and unstated: the exposed passwords were stored as salted MD5 hashes assessed as crackable with modern tooling, and the breach became public only around three years later, when a third party submitted the dataset to Have I Been Pwned (added 2 May 2022). The entry vector was never disclosed and is not load-bearing. (3) The decisive gap sits at the egress stage: protecting stored credentials with a strong salted hash was well-known technical practice, so the expectation originated with material expertise, but operations never realised it - the platform kept the legacy salted MD5 format, which turns a stolen database from an exposure incident into mass recoverable-credential risk for the user base. That is a gap within the material column, a known remedy not executed: Expertise to Execution, resting on the egress stage as the only source-documented load-bearing gap. The response conduct (no disclosure at all, surfacing forced by a third-party leak) suggests a secondary Strategy to Leadership pattern, but it rests on inference from the absence of any victim statement and cannot carry the case. (4) RM26 (Expertise to Execution lens): experts cannot implement adequate protection of data at rest because of legacy and capability limits - the subscriber password store remained in the legacy salted MD5 format long after stronger salted hashing became standard web practice, and the cracked-hash analyses confirm the stored hashes were recoverable, amplifying the impact of the database theft (causal role: Amplifying). RM39 (Expertise to Execution lens): the breach scope and affected population could only be established from the leaked dump itself as counted by third parties (305,470 records at Have I Been Pwned, 312,357 at HEROIC), with no victim-side scoping or notification in three years, so disclosure was constrained to a third-party channel long after the theft (causal role: Constraining).

Evidence by stage

Risk markers

Sources

Notes

Case file carries no incident_id, actor, country or year (source_url is only '/', unusable); the row description matches the Have I Been Pwned Aimware entry. Year 2019 from the 28 April 2019 breach date (HIBP; Mozilla Monitor). Country Switzerland from the victim's own imprint (NETSHARK SAGL, Via al Forte 2, CH-6900 Lugano, CHE-270.160.868), also shown in the footer of an April-2020-era forum thread cited under Manual source-article; the 2019 imprint itself was not separately archived, and HEROIC's page calls the platform United States-based, which conflicts with the imprint. Link check: the dedicated imprint page (aimware.net/imprint) opened during research but returned 404 to the link checker, so the forum-thread URL carrying the same company footer is cited instead. Actor unattributed: the HIBP attribution clerk/anthrax/soontoberichh is the pseudonym of the data-providing source, not of the attack. Record counts differ by source (305,470 HIBP; 312,357 HEROIC; 176,876 unique per a LeakCheck-derived index); HIBP's count and dates are used. HEROIC's page lists 01 Mar 2024 as leak date, which reflects its DarkHive indexing rather than the April 2019 theft. Atypical-victim caveat: Aimware sells game cheats (a terms-of-service matter in the games it targets), but the incident is a commercial personal-data breach of a paying subscriber base and is classified on the site's own data-handling posture. The privacy-policy sentence is generic reasonable-safeguards language, too generic to code RM44. Per the security policy, no leak sites, dumps or breach databases were accessed; the Have I Been Pwned and Mozilla Monitor pages are breach-notification records (metadata and recommended actions only) and served as the dated disclosure timeline. Entry vector, victim-side detection and containment are nowhere documented.