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1177 Vårdguiden patient call recordings exposed (no actor, 2019)

2019 · Sweden · Q - Human health and social work activities · Sensitive data exposure via misconfigured third-party server

Analysed 2026-11-07 by Hermes

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What happened

Sensitive data exposure via misconfigured third-party server

Dual vulnerability type

Strategy to Execution

Evidence coverage: 4/6 stages, weight 23/60

Decisive stage: entry (clearest evidence) · Alternative: Expertise to Execution

Why this classification

(1) 1177 Vårdguiden is the healthcare advice service owned by all 21 Swedish regions; calls answered by the regional care-giver Medhelp AB were recorded for patient-safety and quality purposes and had to be handled as confidential patient data under Swedish healthcare legislation and GDPR arts. 5.1 f and 32, and could only be outsourced within the statutory secrecy framework. (2) In practice, recordings of calls routed via Medhelp to its subcontractor Medicall Co Ltd were stored on technology partner Voice Integrate Nordic's network-attached storage, which a misconfiguration had made reachable from the public internet without authentication or encryption - the IP address alone gave access to some 2.7 million files (650,000-900,000 calls) dating back to 2013; the chain noticed nothing, and Computer Sweden's 18 February 2019 exposé ended the exposure. IMY's 2021 investigation additionally found Medhelp had outsourced care and patient-data processing to the Thai company without legal basis (outside healthcare secrecy law), had never informed callers about the processing, and had never backed up the recordings. (3) The gap is doctrinal origin with an execution break: the protection and outsourcing obligations existed at the strategic/legal level throughout - contracts were even signed (a processor agreement with Voice Integrate in May 2018) - yet none of them translated into the operational reality of the vendor chain, and IMY's core lesson was that a controller must keep track of its processors and verify they meet their commitments. The entry was not an intrusion; no attacker or entry vector is involved, so entry technique is not load-bearing - the breach is the exposure itself. The classification rests on the exposure/entry stage, the best-documented one (IMY primary findings). (4) RM13 (Strategy to Execution lens): supplier-security requirements and contracts did not translate into controlled third-party operation - Medhelp contracted Medicall for night/weekend care and Voice Integrate for recording, but nobody verified the recordings were actually protected, and IMY found the Medicall delegation lacked legal basis under healthcare law (causal role: Enabling). RM27 (Strategy to Execution lens): exposure rules never reached the deployed system - the NAS holding years of patient recordings sat exposed on the public internet without password protection or encrypted communication (causal role: Enabling). RM31 (Strategy to Execution lens): the duty to safeguard patient documentation was never translated into backups - Medhelp had no backup of the recordings in its IT environment, and IMY had to order isolated, tested backups afterwards (causal role: Constraining). RM16 (Strategy to Execution lens): privacy requirements were not implemented in processes - callers received no information about the processing beyond a voicemail notice, and recordings containing personal identity numbers, with caller phone numbers in file names, accumulated unprotected in an open archive (causal role: Amplifying).

Evidence by stage

Risk markers

Sources

Notes

Victim as written in the row is Vårdguiden, the 1177 healthcare advice service owned by all 21 Swedish regions; the exposed calls were those routed to care-giver Medhelp AB (for regions Stockholm, Sörmland and Värmland) and its subcontractor Medicall Co Ltd (Thailand), stored on Voice Integrate Nordic's NAS. The row says the breach was blamed on subcontractor Medicall; IMY instead assigned responsibility to Medhelp and Voice Integrate and fined the three regions for failing to inform callers - Medicall was not among the fined actors; Inera's case was closed without action. Scale: about 2.7 million files on the server, which IMY estimated to be 650,000-900,000 calls (3-10 files per call); the row's 170,000 hours matches Computer Sweden's figure. Year 2019 is the only established year: the exposure was disclosed and closed on 18 February 2019, the recordings dated back to 2013, but IMY could not establish when the misconfiguration occurred or how long the files were exposed. No threat actor: this is accidental exposure, not an intrusion. The idg.se source URLs in the case file now redirect to the computersweden.se article cited here. IMY decision (7 June 2021): Medhelp 12 MSEK total (8 MSEK exposure, 3 MSEK unlawful Medicall agreement, 0.5 MSEK missing information, 0.5 MSEK missing backup), Voice Integrate 650 kSEK, Region Stockholm 500 kSEK, Region Sörmland and Region Värmland 250 kSEK each.