2015 · Germany · O - Public administration and defence · Distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack on public government websites
Analysed 2026-11-06 by Hermes
Open this case in the tool →Distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack on public government websites
No DV evidenced
Alternative: none defensible
(1) The expectation at the victim was that the public web presences of the Federal Government and Bundestag stay reachable; they were deliberately hosted by a commercial provider outside the government network (Regierungsnetz), for which the BSI is not directly responsible. (2) On 7 January 2015 a DDoS attack - TCP SYN flood, UDP reflection and web-application attacks from thousands of botnet clients worldwide, with bandwidth that overloaded the internet uplink - made www.bundeskanzlerin.de, www.bundesregierung.de and www.bundestag.de unreachable from about 10:00, later also the Foreign Office site; the outage was first noticed in the BSI's own Lagezentrum, filter rules and a dedicated internet line restored availability, the attack continued into the next day without further visible effect, no data was stolen, and the Bundestag's internal IT systems were unaffected. (3) The documented sources (the BSI's own incident report, government statements quoted by dpa/heise and Reuters) confirm the impact and a response that worked, but none documents a victim-side gap with an origin and a break: no policy, expert warning, audit finding or resourcing decision on the DDoS protection of these hosted sites is on record, and the BSI president himself characterized the attack as exceptional for its political significance, not its technique. The only coded condition, RM32, is therefore stated without a DV lens: the availability protection of the hosted sites could not keep them reachable under a large botnet flood, but no source shows whether that reflected a strategy that was not executed, a decision that was never taken, or simply an unusually strong attack - the decision rule for Unknown applies, because the reporting confirms impact only. The case is also atypical for the framework: an attacker-disclosed, politically motivated disruption of a state's public web presence, with the claim of responsibility itself unverified (the BSI notes it is not known whether CyberBerkut actually carried out the attack); entry, containment, detection, egress and recovery show no documented victim-side gap.
RM32 — Capacity / availability-protection gapDataset label: the case file's name field is 'Cyberberkut vs. Germany', which names the claiming attacker group rather than the victim; the victim is derived descriptively from the receiver fields and the sources (Chancellery/Press Office, Bundestag, Foreign Office websites). Date discrepancy: eurepoc_extra.start_date is 01.07.2015, but the BSI's Lagebericht 2015 and all reporting date the attack to 7 January 2015; Year 2015 follows the sources, not the start_date. Attribution: responsibility was claimed by CyberBerkut; Reuters noted the claim could not be independently verified and the BSI report states it is not known whether the group was actually behind the attack; CrowdStrike's 2015 Global Threat Report describes CyberBerkut as pro-Russian separatists with indications of ties to Russian state security - pattern-level context only, not incident-specific attribution. Hosting: the targeted sites were run by a commercial service provider outside the government network; the Bundestag stated its internal IT systems were unaffected. Do not conflate this January 2015 DDoS with the later 2015 intrusion into the Bundestag's internal network reported in the same year's BSI report - that is a different incident and is not classified here. euRepoC 'source_disclosure: Incident disclosed by attacker' matches the record (claim posted on cyber-berkut.org; government confirmed the same day). Link check: reuters.com blocks automated access (HTTP 401); the page was opened and read during research.