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PDRM Social Media Defacement (AnonGhost, 2015)

2015 · Malaysia · O - Public administration and defence · Social media account takeover and defacement

Analysed 2026-11-06 by Hermes

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What happened

Social media account takeover and defacement

Dual vulnerability type

No DV evidenced

Alternative: none defensible

Why this classification

(1) The Royal Malaysia Police runs its official Facebook and Twitter pages as its public communications channels; the standing expectation for a national police force is that administrator access to these accounts is protected and that a compromise of the public channels does not reach police systems or data. (2) On Monday 13 July 2015 at about 2.20pm the pro-ISIS group AnonGhost took over both official accounts, replacing images and posting Islamic State propaganda and threats against the Prime Minister; PDRM acknowledged the takeover on Twitter within minutes, said the accounts were restored by about 4.40pm (control of the Facebook page regained at about 4.45pm), and the Inspector-General of Police stated that police data and intelligence were intact and the systems were not compromised. (3) The record confirms impact only and names no victim-side mechanism: the entry technique was never disclosed (the IGP said experts were investigating, but no investigative or forensic result was published), no regulator or court examined the incident, and the stages that ARE documented show aligned conduct - detection was immediate (the police reported the hacking themselves while it was in progress), recovery took under three hours, the public account matched events, and there was no data theft or system compromise. With no documented gap in any of the six lifecycle stages, no knowing-doing or doctrinal-material gap can be placed on either axis, so the case is Unknown for insufficient evidence rather than a DV-Type; the entry vector is unknown and not load-bearing, and an Expertise to Execution reading based on AnonGhost's documented pattern of credential compromise and opportunistic web weaknesses (ADL profile) is an attacker-side pattern, not evidence of a victim-side remedy known and not executed at PDRM. The atypical, symbolic-defacement nature of the incident is flagged in Notes.

Sources

Notes

Data quality: the case file gives start_date 13.06.2015, but every opened report (Malay Mail, MalaysiaKini, Straits Times, HackRead) dates the incident to Monday 13 July 2015 - the EuRepoC date looks like a day/month slip; the year 2015 is firm. The row's name field 'Malaysian Social Media Hacked' is an incident label, not an organisation; the victim (Royal Malaysia Police, Facebook page PolisDirajaMalaysia and Twitter @pdrmsia) is derived from the description and the reporting. Disclosure was attacker-driven (the defacement itself was public), but the victim acknowledged the hack on its own Twitter within minutes and its statements matched the timeline, so RM39 does not apply; RM22 was considered and NOT coded because no source links the takeover to a documented PDRM authentication or credential weakness (exclusion condition not cleared). Attribution rests on the group's self-attribution in the compromised accounts, as reported by the press; the ADL profile of AnonGhost is used only for actor context, and attacker claims are cited as reported by legitimate press only - no leak sites or attacker channels were visited.