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Iran MoD website defacement (RxRHaCker, 2015)

2015 · Iran · O - Public administration and defence · Website defacement with political message

Analysed 2026-11-06 by Hermes

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What happened

Website defacement with political message

Dual vulnerability type

No DV evidenced

Alternative: none defensible

Why this classification

(1) The strategic expectation at a defence ministry is that its public web estate, including a recruitment portal handling applications from religious and ethnic minorities for the defence sector, is protected and monitored. (2) What the sources show is impact only: a Saudi hacktivist self-identifying as RxR HaCker defaced the Gozinesh recruitment subdomain of the Iranian Ministry of Defense (gozinesh.mod.ir) in early May 2015 with a Yemen-war message insulting the Iranian supreme leader, and the site was restored shortly after, before or around the time of first reporting; the entry vector, dwell time, detection path and any victim response are nowhere disclosed. (3) The incident is a hacktivist propaganda defacement in the Saudi-Iranian cyber exchange over Yemen (Recorded Future places it among the rapid exchange of defacements and account hijackings of April-May 2015); the incident-specific csidb record states that no technical details regarding intrusion methods, data exfiltration, or defensive measures were disclosed in available reporting. With no source documenting a victim-side condition at entry, containment, detection, egress, recovery or response, no knowing-doing or doctrinal-material gap can be placed on either axis: the classification is Unknown because the evidence, not the search, is exhausted - the entry vector is unknown and not load-bearing, and quick restoration is the only recovery fact on record, which points to no gap either. No regulator, CERT or victim statement exists to fill the gap.

Sources

Notes

Attribution rests solely on the attacker's self-attribution via the defacement page (eurepoc: self-attribution, attacker confirms); no independent verification. Disclosure was by the attacker; the victim made no statement found in English, Persian or secondary sources searched. Date discrepancy: the dataset gives start_date 14.05.2015, while Hackread (published 09-05-2015, 'Thursday night' = 07-05) and the csidb record date the defacement 07-05-2015; Year is 2015 either way. Recovery is the only stage with a positive fact (site restored at time of first reporting) and documents no gap. The Zone-H mirror link in the dataset's source article was not opened (defacement-archive site, outside research boundaries).