2015 · Turkey · O - Public administration and defence · Website defacement and DDoS campaign (hacktivist cyberwar)
Analysed 2026-11-06 by Hermes
Open this case in the tool →Website defacement and DDoS campaign (hacktivist cyberwar)
No DV evidenced
Alternative: none defensible
Atypical, attacker-side case: the row describes the Armenian side of the April 2015 hacktivist cyberwar between Armenian and Turkish nationalist groups (triggered by Pope Francis' genocide remarks and the 100th anniversary of 1915), with Armenian groups attacking Turkish government websites; EuRepoC records the receiver as Turkish state institutions / government ministries (receiver_country Turkey, start 01.04.2015, end 24.04.2015). The evidence base is one-sided: the impact claims - 1,733 Turkish websites hacked and databases of 63+ sites leaked, DDoS against the Ministry of Foreign Affairs - come from a Monte Melkonian Cyber Army representative speaking to HackRead, and the 300-site figure is a claim relayed by an Armenian security expert via ARKA; the incident was disclosed by the attackers themselves, and the dataset records only short-term disruption (<24h, intensity 1) with data_theft none. Across the six lifecycle stages (entry, containment, detection, egress, recovery, response) no victim-side gap is documented anywhere in the searched record: the entry vector of the defacements is unspecified, there is no Turkish CERT, regulator or follow-up reporting on dwell time, containment, data governance or recovery, and the only victim-side statement found (Culture Minister Ismetihan Talay on attempted attacks on kultur.gov.tr, via Mediamax/PAN.am) describes the ministry placing the site under continuous inspection and preparing an alternative system - protective readiness, not a gap. Under the decision rule, reporting that confirms impact only, with no defensible victim-side mechanism at any stage, and a diffuse hacktivist-vs-hacktivist campaign without a single victim organisation in the framework's sense, yields Unknown; the entry vector is unknown and not load-bearing.
Data quality: the victim column carries the dataset campaign label 'Armenian-Turk Cyberwar Armenian Side' rather than an organisation; the case file itself names no receiver_name, and its eurepoc_extra fields (receiver_country Turkey, receiver_category State institutions / political system, subcategory Government / ministries) show the actual victims are Turkish government institutions. Source caveats: the key impact figures (1,733 sites hacked, 63+ databases leaked) are unverified self-attribution by the attackers to HackRead; the 300-site figure repeats a Caucasus Cyber Army claim via an Armenian security expert; a database leak would contradict the dataset's data_theft=none, but no independent confirmation was found. Disclosure was by the attacker (eurepoc_extra.source_disclosure). A MEMRI mirror of the HackRead report (memri.org/cjlab/cyberwar-armenian-turkish-hackers-target-each-others-govt-websites) failed to open and is not cited. No related_rows in the case file; no earlier result for this victim in the output directory. Search covered English and Armenian/Turkish-angle leads (HackRead, ARKA, PAN.am/Mediamax, security press): no Turkish government or CERT statement documenting a victim-side control failure was found. Link check: arkatelecom.am blocks automated access (HTTP 403); the page was opened and read during research.