← Breach analysis by the Dual Vulnerabilities framework

Philippine DOJ and arbitration-linked organizations espionage (NanHaiShu/APT 40, 2015)

2015 · Philippines · O - Public administration and defence · Cyber-espionage via targeted spearphishing (data theft)

Analysed 2026-11-06 by Hermes

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What happened

Cyber-espionage via targeted spearphishing (data theft)

Dual vulnerability type

No DV evidenced

Alternative: none defensible

Why this classification

(1) The doctrinal expectation at the victims would have to come from documented policy, statements or decisions of the Philippine Department of Justice, the APEC 2015 organizers or the law firm; none are publicly available - the entire record of this case is a threat report by F-Secure (published July 2016, TLP:White) plus press coverage repeating it, with no regulator, court or victim document. (2) In practice: from January to November 2015 the NanHaiShu remote-access trojan was delivered to employees of these organizations through spearphishing emails with booby-trapped Excel attachments named after arbitration events or internal documents (e.g. 'DOJ Staff bonus January 13, 2015.xls'); the recipients had to enable macros, after which the RAT uploaded system information to command-and-control servers and let the attackers download files, and F-Secure reported the campaign in 2016 after notifying the identified targets before publication. (3) This is Unknown because no lifecycle stage yields a defensible victim-side mechanism: the entry vector (spearphished Office macros) is documented but is an attacker technique and is not load-bearing for the DV; detection rests on the external security vendor's discovery, not on any documented victim monitoring failure; and no source documents any policy, leadership decision, resourcing or escalation fact at any victim, so the origin x break test cannot be answered from evidence anywhere in the lifecycle (detection, egress, recovery and response/disclosure conduct of the victims are simply undocumented - none of the named organizations ever publicly acknowledged the compromise; CFR's APT 40 entry lists the victim government reaction as unknown). Per the decision rule, when the reporting confirms impact (confirmed RAT infections and file theft) but no victim-side mechanism, the DV-Type stays Unknown; no risk marker is coded because no victim-side condition is documented to the standard the code book requires. The case is also atypical for the framework's sense of an organizational breach: it is a state-affiliated, multi-organisation espionage campaign against parties to the Philippines v. China arbitration, attributed to Chinese-origin actors and later mapped to the MSS Hainan State Security Department (FireEye APT40 report 2019, CISA/FBI advisory and US DOJ indictment 2021), which describe group TTPs but say nothing about the victims' internal lifecycle.

Sources

Notes

Row name 'Conflict around South Chinese Sea' is an incident label, not an organisation; the description's 'APE Cand intl. Lawfirm' is an abbreviation of 'APEC and intl. Lawfirm' - the F-Secure whitepaper names the targets as the Philippine Department of Justice, the organizers of the November 2015 APEC Summit and one unnamed major international law firm representing a party to the arbitration. Case file is the only source for the row: receiver_name is absent, so the victim is named descriptively from description + whitepaper; country Philippines and year 2015 come from eurepoc_extra (receiver_country; start_date 01.01.2015). Sector 'O Public administration and defence' reflects the primary named victim (receiver_subcategory 'Government / ministries'); the two other targets carry no receiver category in the dataset. Disclosure was by the IT-security company (eurepoc_extra.source_disclosure); the whitepaper states F-Secure attempted to notify the identified targets before publication, and no victim organisation publicly acknowledged the intrusion. Attribution to NanHaishu/APT 40/MSS follows the dataset and later group-level reporting (FireEye 2019, CISA/FBI 2021); those reports describe attacker TTPs only and were not used as victim-side evidence. No risk markers coded: the closest victim-side conditions (the default Office macro-blocking setting was modified in the target environment for the attack to work; command-and-control traffic persisted until an external party found the campaign) are inferences from the attacker-side analysis and no source documents their origin or break. incident_id 676 is the EuRepoC dataset identifier. Related-actor rows in this run (260, 456, 2573) cover the same group (APT 40/Leviathan) at different victims and were not treated as related rows.