2014 · Israel · O - Public administration and defence · Website takedowns by distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks
Analysed 2026-11-06 by Hermes
Open this case in the tool →Website takedowns by distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks
No DV evidenced
Alternative: none defensible
(1) Strategic expectation at the victim: the affected parties are Israeli state institutions' public web estates (Prime Minister's Office, IDF, Bank of Israel, Finance Ministry, Central Bureau of Statistics, the Embassy of Israel to the US and other government sites); state cyber defences existed - for the 2014 Anonymous campaign the Shin Bet (Israel Security Agency) said it had opened a special cyber operations room and the authorities reported the onslaught produced only minor slowdowns on dozens of official sites - but no source documents a specific expectation or requirement for these sites' availability or its breach. (2) What happened in practice: on 24-25 August 2014 hackers operating under the Anonymous banner and the AntiSec alias took several Israeli government websites offline, publishing the takedown list on Pastebin as retaliation for the alleged shutdown of Anonymous-affiliated social media accounts and in claimed solidarity with Gaza (#OpSaveGaza); idf.gov.il was still offline when reported on 25 August and the EuRepoC row records the disruption as short-term (<24h) with no data theft, disclosed by the attacker itself; the ICT's retrospective on the Op-Israel campaigns states the significant sites attacked suffered only short-term disruptions, at most, and no substantial damage. (3) Why this is Unknown rather than a DV-Type: the sources confirm impact only. There was no intrusion to contain, detect or recover internal systems from - this was an availability attack on public-facing websites - and no source documents any victim-side gap at entry, containment, detection, egress, recovery or response; services were restored within a day and the victim side commented only to downplay. The visible condition - high-profile government sites becoming unreachable under a crowd-sourced DDoS flood - is an availability-protection issue in kind (the RM32 territory), but no source states why protection was insufficient (absent, under-resourced or simply exceeded), so its origin and break cannot be evidenced and it is described here rather than coded; an 'attackers used DDoS, therefore DV-Type Y' inference is rejected reasoning. The case also has an atypical cast: a diffuse hacktivist campaign across many agencies at intensity 1, disclosed by the attacker, with no single organisation's governance documented. (4) No lens sentences: DV-Type is Unknown, so no marker lens applies.
Data quality: the row carries no receiver_name and its name field is an operation title quoted from the dataset ('Anonymous Takedown of israeli pages part II'); the Victim was derived descriptively from the description and the sources. The description matches the incident found (24-08-2014 Anonymous/AntiSec takedown of Israeli government sites), so no mismatch to report. The dataset's source_url (news.softpedia.com) now sits behind a Cloudflare challenge, so the cited link is the 28-08-2014 Wayback snapshot opened in this analysis; the RT article on the same event was unreachable from this container and is not cited. Source caveats: attribution is self-attribution by the attackers (EuRepoC attribution_basis 'Attacker confirms'), and parts of the wider #OpSaveGaza/#OpIsrael campaign consisted of false or inflated takedown claims (ICT retrospective), but the 24-25 August 2014 government-site outages were confirmed by multiple independent reports; impact figures for the incident itself are only attacker-side claims plus EuRepoC coding (intensity 1, short-term disruption <24h, economic impact 0, disclosed by attacker). No regulator, CERT or victim investigation of the incident was found. Unattended run: nothing requiring consent arose.