2014 · United Kingdom · O - Public administration and defence · DDoS attack causing a temporary government website outage
Analysed 2026-11-06 by Hermes
Open this case in the tool →DDoS attack causing a temporary government website outage
No DV evidenced
Alternative: none defensible
(1) Strategic expectation at the victim: the Ministry of Justice runs justice.gov.uk, the public information website of a UK government department, and is expected to keep it reachable under adversarial load; in December 2013 the responsible minister had publicly described defence of UK government systems as a never-ending battle, so the threat of disruption was acknowledged at strategic level. (2) What happened: during the night of 11-12 February 2014 justice.gov.uk was flooded with traffic and taken offline; the Ministry announced the outage on its own Twitter account, worked to restore it, and reported the site back up about three hours later; hacktivists took credit, claiming the Ministry was targeted for not condemning NSA surveillance in the week the Snowden disclosures on GCHQ operations against hackers dominated the news; the GCHQ website was disrupted the same day (Netcraft, cited by Softpedia, observed noticeable performance issues). There was no intrusion and no data theft, and the Ministry's later FOIA correspondence recorded that it had used the media (Twitter) to tell users the site was down and being restored. (3) Why the classification is Unknown: the opened sources confirm impact only. The outage documents an availability-protection condition (the flood was sufficient to take the site down for hours) but no source shows a DDoS-protection requirement that leadership knew and deferred, under-resourced or discounted (no leadership break evidenced), nor a decided, resourced protection that operations failed to realise (no execution break evidenced); no regulator, CERT or formal investigation examined the incident. The Ministry's prompt self-disclosure and same-day restoration are positive conduct at the response and recovery stages, but for 'No DV evidenced' positive evidence of alignment across the lifecycle, including the victim's protection posture at the availability stage, would be required and is not documented. The volumetric-flooding mechanism is attacker-side context and is not load-bearing for the DV assessment.
RM32 — Capacity / availability-protection gapThe row's description covers two sites: the case file's receiver list carries the Ministry of Justice (Government / ministries) and GCHQ (coded Police subcategory); the classification is based on the primary victim named in the row, the Ministry of Justice - the GCHQ website was not confirmed fully offline (Netcraft, cited by Softpedia, reported performance issues). The claim of responsibility is an unverified attacker self-attribution (initiator Unknown / hacktivists; no official attribution was made). The case file's source_disclosure 'Incident disclosed by attacker' does not match the opened reporting, in which the earliest public statement is the Ministry's own @MoJGovUK tweet of 12 February 2014. The Sky News story was published 12 February 2014 but updated later (it references March 2014 events); the MoJ tweet it quotes is the same 12 February 2014 tweet quoted by the other sources. The justice.gov.uk site had also been hit by Anonymous DDoS campaigns in April and August 2012; the recurring-weakness marker was not coded because no source documents that earlier lessons were recorded and then left unimplemented. The ICO decision notice of 28 March 2018 (FS50658947) was read as extracted text; the same document also confirms the Ministry acknowledged the 2014 DDoS and its short-lived website outage in FOIA correspondence. No consent-gated actions were taken (unattended run). Link check: news.softpedia.com blocks automated access (HTTP 403); the page was opened and read during research. Link check: news.sky.com blocks automated access (HTTP 403); the page was opened and read during research. Link check: ico.org.uk blocks automated access (HTTP 403); the page was opened and read during research.