2014 · Ecuador · O - Public administration and defence · Cyberespionage campaign with data theft via spear-phishing malware (multi-target)
Analysed 2026-11-06 by Hermes
Open this case in the tool →Cyberespionage campaign with data theft via spear-phishing malware (multi-target)
No DV evidenced
Alternative: none defensible
(1) The row is the second phase of the El Machete campaign: EuRepoC records that unidentified hackers attributed to be of Brazilian origin attacked high-profile targets, mostly in Latin America, with phishing attacks, and that unlike the first phase the targets also included energy system providers; receiver coding puts intelligence services, military, government ministries, energy and chemicals bodies and corporate targets across ten countries. A strategic expectation at the victim can only be reasoned from the sector (state institutions and power/telecom providers are expected to defend their networks and detect espionage) - no doctrinal artefact, audit, expert warning or leadership decision of any victim organisation appears in any source opened. (2) What the record documents is the attacker's operation and the impact. Kaspersky (2014) found a campaign active since 2010, renewed in 2012, distributed through spear-phishing and fake blogs, with no zero-day exploits and 778 victims identified. The Cylance SPEAR follow-up (March 2017) identified over three hundred unique victims in one month and over 100GB of data exfiltrated and stored on one C2 server, targeting intelligence services, military, utility providers (telecommunications and power), embassies and government institutions, and reported that the group kept operating with minor malware changes and new dynamic-DNS C2 after public disclosure: 'El Machete has continued largely unimpeded in their espionage activities for the past several years, despite the abundance of publicly available indicators.' Detection and disclosure came entirely from external security vendors ('Incident disclosed by IT-security company'); no victim organisation, CERT or regulator published an account of its controls, timeline or response. (3) The lifecycle rule asks for a victim-side gap per stage, answered by an origin (doctrinal or material) and a break (leadership or execution) from the evidence. The repeated compromise by low-sophistication malware and the years of undetected espionage are documented only as a campaign-level observation across at least ten countries and hundreds of unnamed organisations; no source states where the chain broke inside any one of them. Cylance's remark that targeted countries 'have yet to fully mature and develop their own internal cyber capabilities' is a sector-level capability assessment, not incident-confirmed evidence about an organisation's decisions or operations, and a stage whose DV-Type rests only on the coder's inference can never carry the classification - so no DV-Type is defensible and the case is Unknown with no assessable mechanism. The entry vector is documented (spear-phishing with .scr payloads in ZIP/RAR archives and fake blogs) but per the core rule it is the attacker's move, not a victim-side DV: it is not load-bearing here. The fact that the campaign survived its own 2014 public disclosure and still ran at 300+ victims a month in 2017 is a learning failure at sector level; with victims this diffuse it is described here rather than coded. Consistent with result-2437 (HpReact, El Machete/APT-C-43, 2019), where the same evidentiary situation was classified Unknown.
RM24 — Human-factor / social-engineering susceptibilityRM28 — Endpoint / malware-protection gapRM34 — Monitoring / detection / alert-handling gapVictim naming: the case file carries no receiver_name and its name field ELMachete-PartII is the EuRepoC campaign label, not an organisation; it is kept as the stated victim with the affected target classes from receiver_category/receiver_subcategory and the vendor reports added in parentheses. Diffuse multi-organisation campaign: receiver_country lists ten countries (Ecuador, Venezuela, Peru, Argentina, Colombia, Korea, the United States, Bolivia, the United Kingdom, Canada); Country follows the EuRepoC convention of taking eurepoc_extra.receiver_country (first listed, Ecuador; both vendor reports name Ecuador, Venezuela, Peru, Argentina and Colombia as most heavily affected). Sector is forced to one SBI section: receiver_category is majority State institutions / political system, so O Public administration and defence, although energy and chemicals bodies and corporate targets are also coded. Year: eurepoc_extra.start_date is 01.01.2014 (Kaspersky's disclosure of phase I); the phase-2 reporting (Cylance SPEAR, SecurityWeek, Security Affairs) is from March 2017; Year follows start_date per the column convention. Attribution: initiator_country Brazil rests on the IT-security-community attribution - Cylance speculates the actors are Brazilian because the heaviest-targeted countries border Brazil, while finding no Brazilian victims, against Kaspersky's Spanish-speaking-attacker finding; unverified and not load-bearing. Data quality: data_theft scores 'For private / commercial targets: non-sensitive information' although the coded receivers include intelligence services and military organisations; recorded as a dataset inconsistency, not used in the analysis. Source provenance: the case file's threatvector.cylance.com URL no longer serves the article (it redirects to the Arctic Wolf blog index), so the specific 2017-04-17 Wayback snapshot of the original Cylance SPEAR article is cited, which was opened and read; the securityaffairs.co source URL was opened and served the article via redirect to securityaffairs.com. Related row: result-2437 (HpReact, same El Machete group) was read; victim naming and the Unknown reading are kept consistent; its case file and result carry a distinct 2019 campaign, so it is not merged here. Unattended run: no consent-gated actions were required; only public sources were read.