2014 · O - Public administration and defence · Multi-year state-sponsored espionage campaign (data theft and system misuse)
Analysed 2026-11-06 by Hermes
Open this case in the tool →Multi-year state-sponsored espionage campaign (data theft and system misuse)
No DV evidenced
Alternative: none defensible
The row does not describe one organisation's breach but the threat actor's multi-year campaign: it carries no receiver_name and labels the case with the actor's own name, "Leviathan aka APT 40". The sources confirm this: Proofpoint (the row's source and attribution source) tracks an espionage actor active since at least 2014 that spearphishes defence contractors, universities with military research ties and government agencies in the US, Western Europe and the South China Sea; FireEye/Mandiant describes APT40 as a China-nexus espionage operation active since at least 2013; the July 2021 DOJ indictment charges four MSS-linked actors with hacking dozens of victim companies, universities and government entities in twelve countries between 2011 and 2018. In every account the disclosures come from IT-security companies, a court charging document and joint government advisories - no victim organisation published its own incident account, and none of the sources documents a victim-side gap at any lifecycle stage (entry, containment, detection, egress, recovery, response) for any identifiable target. A DV classification assesses a specific victim's knowing-doing or doctrinal-material gap; with no victim organisation established and no lifecycle evidence tied to any single one, no mechanism can be placed on either DV axis. Per the method spec's decision rule for attacker-side cases that have no victim organisation in the framework's sense, the DV-Type stays Unknown (atypical, attacker-side campaign record). A separate 2022 FBI/ASD-ACSC case study describes compromises of two anonymised organisations by APT40, but those are later, distinct incidents against victims this row does not describe, so they were not substituted into this classification.
Data quality: the row's name/victim value is the threat actor's name - "Leviathan aka APT 40" - not a victim; the case file carries no receiver_name, and receiver_category/receiver_country list repeated target categories (government ministries, defence industry, corporate targets, science) across United States / Western Europe / South China Sea. Atypical, attacker-side: the row records the actor's campaign as tracked by security vendors, so DV-Type is Unknown per the decision rule; risk markers left at zero because no victim-side condition is evidenced. Country left null: multi-country campaign (the method spec leaves Country blank for unspecified/multi-organisation campaigns); the checker's empty-Country warning refers to this. Year 2014 taken from eurepoc_extra.start_date (01.01.2014); vendor reporting gives the campaign as active since at least 2013-2014 and the DOJ indictment 2011-2018, but the row's own start date governs. Sector: the method spec would leave Sector blank for a diffuse multi-category campaign, but the output check requires exactly one CBS SBI entry; 'O Public administration and defence' chosen because the load-bearing target categories in the case file are government ministries and defence industry. source_disclosure is 'Incident disclosed by IT-security company'; attribution_basis is 'IT-security community attributes attacker' (attribution_source_url is the same Proofpoint post cited as source_url) - attribution to the MSS/Hainan Xiandun structure is by the security community and the 2021 US indictment, not invoked by the row's own attribution field (initiator_subcategory notes it is a widely held view not invoked in the case). Unattended run: no action requiring consent (no forms, logins, uploads) was needed or taken.