2013 · Venezuela · O - Public administration and defence · Website defacement campaign against government websites (short-term disruption)
Analysed 2026-11-07 by Hermes
Open this case in the tool →Website defacement campaign against government websites (short-term disruption)
No DV evidenced
Alternative: none defensible
(1) The victims are a diffuse set of Venezuelan public bodies - state and municipal institutions (Merida state prosecutor office pgmerida, Fundacite Portuguesa, ZONFIPCA, IAMDR, the municipalities Brion, Torres and Casbell, the Delta Amacuro court, the Maturin municipal police) plus a naval garrison sub-domain of the Venezuelan military site - and none of them documented any security expectation in the available record. (2) What is documented is impact only: on 30 November 2013 a hacker using the Twitter handle LiberoamericaMu, said to belong to the Hack Argentino team, claimed to have gained access to multiple Venezuelan government websites and defaced them with anti-government slogans; the 1 December 2013 report states that at the time of writing all affected sites were still defaced, and the EuRepoC entry records short-term disruption (under 24h), no data theft, and disclosure by the attacker. The entry vector is undisclosed; no victim statement, regulator or CERT notice, or official follow-up was found in English or Spanish reporting. (3) Because the reporting confirms impact only and the sole incident-specific source is a security blog reproducing the attacker's own claim, no lifecycle stage yields a victim-side gap whose origin (doctrinal/material) and break (leadership/execution) can be answered from evidence: the roughly one-day persistence of the defacements hints at a slow response but no source documents detection or response at any of the victim bodies, so even that rests on inference alone. Under the decision rule (set Unknown when reporting confirms impact only) the DV-Type is Unknown, and an alternative reading such as Expertise to Execution from presumed weak web-server hardening is rejected because no source documents any specific vulnerability or known remedy. The victim is also diffuse (about ten small municipal/state bodies), which the framework's single-victim sense fits poorly.
Link check: the case file's source_url (ehackingnews.com) now returns 404; cited instead is the Wayback snapshot 20131202043021 opened during this analysis and the live mirror at cysecurity.news (successor site carrying the same article), both verified. One-sided source: the incident narrative rests on the attacker's self-claim (Twitter message and defacement texts) as reproduced by a hacking-news blog; no victim-side or official corroboration was found, including Spanish-language searches. Victim is diffuse: the source lists nine municipal/state sites plus one military sub-domain, so the victim is named descriptively. Provenance of date: 30.11.2013 start and short-term (<24h) disruption come from the EuRepoC Global-sheet fields in the case file; the article of 01-12-2013 still found all sites defaced. Other incidents found at the same victim/actor, not merged into this row: search results indicate a separate February 2014 wave of defacements of Venezuelan government websites also attributed to Team Hack Argentino with a database leak (reported by Techworm and Vice), and earlier 2013 defacements of Venezuelan military sites by other hackers. Freedom House Freedom on the Net 2013 (cited) documents the general rise of politically-motivated cyberattacks against Venezuelan sites in 2012-2013 but does not name this incident; used as context only. No related_rows in the case file. Unattended run: no step required consent.