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Peruvian National Police website defacement (LulzSecPeru, 2013)

2013 · Peru · O - Public administration and defence · Website defacement (hacktivist)

Analysed 2026-11-07 by Hermes

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What happened

Website defacement (hacktivist)

Dual vulnerability type

No DV evidenced

Alternative: none defensible

Why this classification

(1) As a national police institution, the Peruvian National Police is expected to protect the integrity and availability of its public web presence, but no policy, programme or decision concerning the breached web presence is documented for this incident. (2) What happened: on 19 November 2013 the self-attributing hacktivist group LulzSecPeru hacked and defaced the police website pnp.gob.pe with messages calling the police corrupt and inefficient, urged the site administrator to get to work, and posted a mirror on Zone-H; the site was restored within about a day and, per contemporaneous reporting, the organisation issued no public statement about the incident; the case file records no data theft and short-term disruption under 24 hours, disclosed by the attacker. (3) Why this is Unknown rather than a DV-Type: the reporting in English and Spanish confirms the impact but no victim-side mechanism - the entry vector is nowhere disclosed; no regulator, court or CERT examined this incident; containment, detection and egress are not documented (no data theft, so egress was not in play); recovery was same-day, which if anything indicates alignment; and the absence of a public statement is silence, not a documented disclosure failing. With no source documenting an expectation or knowledge that was not acted on, the origin-and-break test cannot be answered for any stage, so no DV-Type can be placed. This is not an atypical attacker-side case - the PNP is a real victim - the evidence is simply insufficient to classify. The entry vector is unknown and not load-bearing. Peruvian press later reported the group's claim that this intrusion was the first step toward a December 2013 compromise of Ministry of Interior email systems; that is an unverified attacker claim about a different incident and was not used here. Coding an entry gap from the bare fact that a site was defaced would be the rejected attacker-technique reasoning.

Sources

Notes

The row description contains typos (LuzSec for LulzSec, Peruvion, webseite) but matches the documented 19 November 2013 defacement of pnp.gob.pe; no victim/description mismatch. Disclosure was entirely attacker-driven (defacement message, Zone-H mirror, self-attribution); Softpedia reports the National Police issued no statement. Independent technical detail on the intrusion vector was not found in the English or Spanish reporting opened during research, and no official Peruvian statement or investigation of this specific defacement was located; Peru's first cybercrime law dated only weeks earlier. The group's December 2013 claim, reported in Peruvian press, that the police server was a stepping stone into Ministry of Interior systems is an unverified attacker claim about a separate incident and was not treated as evidence for this row. Sector-level remarks in later AP reporting (September 2014) that Peru's cyberpolice were outmatched concern the investigation unit, were disputed by its commander, and are not incident-specific evidence for this defacement. Earlier police-website intrusions by the same group (March 2012) are separate incidents; the case file carries no related_rows. Link check: news.softpedia.com blocks automated access (HTTP 403); the page was opened and read during research. Link check: peru21.pe blocks automated access (HTTP 403); the page was opened and read during research.