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Sergio Massa Website Defacement (Team Hacking Argentino, 2013)

2013 · Argentina · O - Public administration and defence · Website defacement (short-term disruption)

Analysed 2026-11-07 by Hermes

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What happened

Website defacement (short-term disruption)

Dual vulnerability type

No DV evidenced

Alternative: none defensible

Why this classification

(1) The basic expectation at the victim was that the official website of Sergio Massa, leader of the opposition and leading candidate in the Buenos Aires province legislative election of 27 October 2013, would remain under his campaign's control and render its own content. (2) In practice, hacktivists of Team Hacking Argentino breached sergiomassa.org on the eve of the election and replaced the homepage with a message telling him to keep his promises (the defacement text reads in part: "Greetings Mr. Sergio Massa, we hope that all the things you've promised become true!"), the attack was made known by the attackers themselves rather than by the victim, and the site was restored by the following day (Softpedia, 28 October 2013); the same team defaced several other Argentine deputies' sites in the same pre-election operation. (3) The reporting confirms impact only: the entry vector is never disclosed, nothing documents how the breach was detected, contained or responded to beyond the quick restoration, and no victim statement, CERT or regulator document identifies any policy, available remedy, expert warning or leadership decision that was not acted on. Because no lifecycle stage yields a defensible victim-side mechanism, this is Unknown rather than one of the four DV-Types; inferring Expertise to Execution from the fact that a website was hackable would be exactly the rejected attacker-technique reasoning. As context only: the same domain had already been defaced on 10 August 2013 by another hacktivist (LiberoamericaMu, announced via an embedded tweet in the TechWorm report), but since no source documents which weakness either attacker exploited or who was responsible for remediating it, this recurrence cannot ground a mechanism or a marker.

Sources

Notes

The case file's source_url (news.softpedia.com, article of 28-10-2013) blocks automated access (Cloudflare challenge), so the specific article was read in the Internet Archive snapshot of 02-11-2013 cited in Manual source-article. Disclosure is attacker-side only (the case file records the incident as disclosed by the attacker via the defacement); no statement from Massa's campaign and no official or CERT document about the incident was found in English or Spanish searches. No data theft, disruption under 24 hours, weighted intensity 1 in the case file - consistent with the reporting. Earlier incident at the same victim: sergiomassa.org defaced 10-08-2013 by LiberoamericaMu (TechWorm report with embedded tweet); no source names the exploited weakness, so it is noted as context only and no recurrence marker is coded. Victim naming: Massa was leader of the Frente Renovador and candidate in the 27-10-2013 legislative election (also mayor of Tigre); sector coded O as the closest CBS SBI section for a political party / political-system target (the SBI list has no party section). Case-file victim and description are consistent; unattended run - nothing encountered that needs consent, and no leak site or attacker platform was visited.