2024 · Moldova, Republic of · O - Public administration and defence · Distributed denial-of-service attack disrupting election-day systems
Analysed 2026-11-06 by Hermes
Open this case in the tool →Distributed denial-of-service attack disrupting election-day systems
No DV evidenced
Alternative: none defensible
(1) Strategic expectation at the victim: availability and integrity of the election IT on 3 November 2024 - polling stations verify voters against the central voter register - underpinned by a documented pre-election programme: STISC significantly strengthened its capacity to protect election digital infrastructure in the year before the elections (identifying probable targets, preparedness to restore connectivity at polling stations, incident-response training, cybersecurity training for SAISE operators) and an inter-institutional national crisis-response team was set up under the Ministry of Interior. (2) In practice: coordinated DDoS attacks on the connectivity infrastructure of the national voter registration systems, from resources in many countries, temporarily slowed the voter-registration application at polling stations (minor technical issues in 8.5% of observed stations, restored after a few minutes) and affected access to voter-participation data; STISC and CEC personnel acted according to security protocols, the CEC president disclosed the incident at a press conference the same day, functionality was restored, and no data were exfiltrated or corrupted. (3) Why this is alignment rather than a gap: the expectation was doctrinally formulated, identified as threatened, and resourced before the attack, and the chain was then executed under fire - detection, protocol-conform response, minutes-scale recovery and same-day public disclosure are documented in primary sources; the ENEMO observation mission assessed the attacks as timely and efficiently addressed by the authorities, the ODIHR/OSCE PA/PACE statement and the ODIHR final report record that security measures restored functionality, and no primary source documents a victim-side gap at any lifecycle stage - a confirmed negative (control) case under the framework. The attack itself (a volumetric DDoS, part of a hybrid campaign Moldovan authorities reported as Russian-originated but not formally attributed) is attacker-side; the entry vector is not victim-side and not load-bearing. Conditions the evidence does show, described rather than treated as a DV: polling-station verification depends on connectivity to the single central register, so an attack on that one connectivity path propagated into polling-station-level delays (RM04), and availability protection mitigated but did not fully prevent same-day degradation of the election information services (RM32).
RM04 — Control dependency concentrationRM32 — Capacity / availability-protection gapDescription in the case file matches the stated victim (CEC Moldova, 3 Nov 2024 runoff DDoS); no data-quality mismatch. The case's first source_url (agenzianova.com) could not be opened (HTTP 422) and was replaced by the case's second source (euronews.ro) and the formal reports cited. Source conflict on the availability impact: euronews.ro reports the www.cec.md real-time turnout page non-functional the whole election day, while the ENEMO second-round report states the CEC website provided real-time turnout and preliminary results on election day; treated as a limited, same-day availability impact, consistent with the row's short (<24h, intensity 1) coding. The 3 November attack is not formally attributed; STISC reported the first-round (20 October) attacks as originating from the Russian Federation (ODIHR final report, footnote to the election-administration section). The ODIHR final report notes a prior, still-unaddressed recommendation on the shortage of qualified staff at the CEC; that concerns general election-administration staffing, not the cyber mechanism of this incident, so it is not coded. No regulator or formal investigation found omissions or failings in the victim's handling (analogous to the regulator-finding decision rule).