2024 · Macao · O - Public administration and defence · DDoS attack on government websites (short-term disruption)
Analysed 2026-11-06 by Hermes
Open this case in the tool →DDoS attack on government websites (short-term disruption)
Strategy to Execution
Evidence coverage: 1/6 stages, weight 8/60
Decisive stage: recovery (clearest evidence) · Alternative: Expertise to Execution
(1) Strategic expectation: the availability of the Macao SAR security portfolio's public websites and apps rested on formal, stated arrangements - CTM was the operator tasked with blocking DDoS attacks on the five entities' websites, and the Security Portfolio's 2024 policy address committed a standing Cybersecurity Warning and Emergency Response Centre to pre-incident detection and prevention, in-incident response and post-incident investigation. (2) In practice: an overseas volumetric DDoS attack from 20:00 on 10 July 2024 made the GSS, PSP, CB, DSFSM and ESFSM websites and apps unreachable; the filtering restored service at 20:45 only for users of the other operators while CTM's own broadband and mobile customers remained blocked until 23:13, and DSFSM then ordered CTM to thoroughly investigate and submit a report and improvement plan, with CTM pledging to build a higher-standard network security mechanism together with government IT professionals. (3) That is a Strategy to Execution gap, not merely weak security: the protection expectation was doctrinal - a tasked, officially named arrangement and a committed cyber-response programme - yet the operating model did not realise it under the actual attack volume; the ordered improvement plan and joint operational-log review show the formally assigned control was not operationalised to the threat. The classification rests on the recovery/availability stage; the entry vector is not load-bearing (no intrusion, exploited vulnerability or credential was involved). RM32 (Strategy to Execution lens): the portfolio's availability and DDoS-protection requirements were not implemented to effect - the tasked CTM filtering failed to keep five government websites and apps available for up to about three hours, which is exactly the outage timeline and DDoS-mitigation-arrangement evidence the marker expects (causal role: Enabling). RM04 (Strategy to Execution lens): the architecture concentrated availability protection for all five entities on one operator's DDoS-blocking service, so when that single point was overwhelmed recovery options narrowed - non-CTM users were back at 20:45 while CTM's own customers had to wait for CTM alone to clear the impact until 23:13 (causal role: Amplifying).
RM32 — Capacity / availability-protection gapRM04 — Control dependency concentrationNo related rows for this victim in the run. Actor unattributed and no follow-up reporting was found on the perpetrators or on whether CTM's improvement plan was completed; the authorities did not disclose attack details (volumes, sources), so entry-stage conditions are not assessable and are recorded as not in play rather than as gaps. The case file's first Macau Business link did not open; the analysis uses the updated Macau Business article opened during research, and the case file's old-format Macau Post Daily link was replaced by the current article URL (same report). Victim spans five entities under the Secretary for Security plus one receiver category entry for education (the Public Security Forces Academy); treated as one incident at the security portfolio. Timeline nuance: Macau Business and Reuters describe restoration by midnight; the DSFSM follow-up statement gives 20:45 for non-CTM users and 23:13 for CTM users - the fuller DSFSM timeline is used. Link check: reuters.com blocks automated access (HTTP 401); the page was opened and read during research. Link check: rfi.fr blocks automated access (HTTP 403); the page was opened and read during research.