2024 · Germany · K - Financial and insurance activities · Data theft via cyberattack (exfiltration extent undetermined)
Analysed 2026-11-06 by Hermes
Open this case in the tool →Data theft via cyberattack (exfiltration extent undetermined)
No DV evidenced
Alternative: none defensible
(1) As a fund-services company of the cooperative financial network managing closed-end real-estate fund investors' records - addresses, dates of birth, investment amounts, account data, tax numbers, tax-office correspondence and identity documents - DG Immobilien Management sat inside a sector (German critical infrastructure, finance) under established data-protection and IT-security expectations, and those duties form the doctrinal backdrop of the case. (2) In practice, unknown actors penetrated the company, a letter to customers in mid-June 2024 warned that personal data of investors could have leaked, and DZ Bank stated that it could not yet say with certainty whether and to what extent personal data was affected - even though two specialised forensic firms had already examined the incident; no disruption occurred, and police, public prosecution, BSI and the data-protection authority were involved. (3) This leaves an impact-only record: the entry vector is unknown, no source gives an intrusion or detection date or a dwell time, no confirmed exfiltration is documented, and no follow-up reporting, regulator finding or court document (searched through November 2026; the BSI Lagebericht 2024 does not mention the case) discloses a root cause or a specific control gap. The documented response conduct (customer letters, task force, two forensic firms, authorities notified) is procedurally sound but is too partial to serve as the positive, whole-lifecycle evidence of alignment that No DV evidenced requires. Per the method's decision rule - Unknown where reporting confirms impact only and the primary statements themselves hold the cause and scope undetermined - the DV-Type stays Unknown; the entry vector is not load-bearing because it was never disclosed. The one victim-side condition the sources do document is that the incident could not be scoped: at disclosure the company still could not determine whether and which data had left despite the forensic review; RM33 is recorded as that documented condition, with the caveat that no source attributes this to missing or unretrievable logs.
RM33 — Logging / forensic-readiness gapData quality: eurepoc_extra.start_date reads 01.06.2023, but the row's own name and description, the legal_response_date (23-06-2024, Polizei Hessen) and every opened article (dated 22-24 June 2024) place the incident and its disclosure in June 2024; Year is set to 2024 and the start_date is treated as a dataset year typo. Ownership caveat: the row description calls DGIM a subsidiary of DZ Bank, but Handelsblatt reports DZ Bank holds only about five percent of DG Immobilien, with the majority held by the cooperative banks' resolution bank BAG; dpa reporting nonetheless counts DGIM as part of the DZ Bank Group. The first-report Rheinische Post article sits behind a consent/paywall; its content is mirrored in the dpa, tagesschau, heise and t-online articles cited. The actual intrusion date, vector, detection moment and dwell time have never been disclosed; no follow-up reporting, data-protection fine or investigation outcome was found through the analysis date, and the downloaded BSI Lagebericht 2024 contains no mention of DGIM/DZ Bank. RM33 caveat: the inability to scope the exfiltration is the victim's own disclosure-stage statement after a forensic review; no public source attributes it to missing logs. Entity note: the victim is DG Immobilien Management Gesellschaft mbH, Frankfurt am Main (closed-end real-estate fund services); the Heidelberg property-management firm DGIM Deutsche Gesellschaft fuer Immobilienmanagement mbH (dgim.net) is an unrelated company. Security policy: only public news reporting was used; no leak sites or attacker channels were consulted. Unattended run: nothing requiring consent was encountered.