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Central Bank of Libya DDoS attacks (Unattributed, 2024)

2024 · Libya · K - Financial and insurance activities · Distributed denial-of-service attacks (availability disruption)

Analysed 2026-11-06 by Hermes

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What happened

Distributed denial-of-service attacks (availability disruption)

Dual vulnerability type

Expertise to Execution

Evidence coverage: 1/6 stages, weight 6/60

Decisive stage: recovery (clearest evidence) · Alternative: Strategy to Execution

Why this classification

(1) The CBL runs the Individual Foreign Currency Booking Platform, a nationally significant public financial service whose availability is central to the bank's foreign-allocation programme, and the bank's own notice stresses continuous operation and protection of client data. (2) Operationally, a DDoS attack on 1 April 2024 impaired access to the platform for hours until the team resorted to blocking every network address registered outside Libya - an emergency, blanket measure rather than standing DDoS protection - and two days later a similar attack hit the official website, which the bank was still countering while saying it was working to address any potential future breaches; detection and the disclosure itself were prompt, and no data was touched. (3) That is a knowing-doing gap inside the material column: the remedy for exactly this threat class (upstream scrubbing, filtering, capacity headroom) is standard technical knowledge for a public web service of this criticality, yet the documented response shows it was not realised in operations - origin material, break execution; no source documents a leadership decision, deferral or underfunding, so no diagonal or doctrinal reading is evidenced. Entry vector detail and actor are undisclosed but not load-bearing; the classification rests on the recovery (resilience/availability) stage, the only stage with a documented gap. RM32 (Expertise to Execution lens): specialists could not keep the booking platform available under attack within the existing architecture - access was lost for hours on 1 April 2024 and restored only by a manual geo-block, so denial-of-service protection was insufficient to keep the service up (causal role: Enabling). RM21 (Expertise to Execution lens): after the 1 April attack on the platform no standing mitigation was implemented and validated before a comparable attack on the official website recurred on 3 April, with the bank's own notice stating defenses were still being built against similar future attacks (causal role: Perpetuating).

Evidence by stage

Risk markers

Sources

Notes

Source caveats: the disclosure lead in the case file is a Facebook post (facebook.com/CentralBankofLibya/posts/810681511090100) that could not be opened for link-checking; it is cited only as reported, and the victim's own website notice (cbl.gov.ly, English version dated 13-04-2024, Arabic version dated 03-04-2024) is cited in its place. The actor is unattributed and no claim about the attack source exists, so nothing attacker-side is asserted. Data quality: receiver_name, victim and receiver_country carry the same value doubled ('Central Bank of Libya;Central Bank of Libya'; 'Libya;Libya') - one and the same victim. Impact was minor (short-term disruption < 24h, weighted intensity 1, no data breach), and detection, containment and disclosure were prompt, so the recovery/availability stage is the only documented gap. Security-policy note: research was limited to open news, the victim's own notice and public databases; no leak sources were consulted; unattended run - nothing requiring consent was encountered.