2024 · Colombia · Q - Human health and social work activities · Ransomware attack
Analysed 2026-11-06 by Hermes
Open this case in the tool →Ransomware attack
Strategy to Execution
Evidence coverage: 2/6 stages, weight 18/60
Decisive stage: entry (clearest evidence) · Alternative: Expertise to Execution
(1) SES Hospital Universitario de Caldas is a high-complexity hospital recorded as critical infrastructure (health), and its own disclosure shows a doctrinal security layer existed: a layered design of primary and secondary security infrastructure, contracted firewall and disaster-recovery support, and a formal cyber contingency plan whose first phase is containment of the spread of malicious software. (2) In practice, on 19 March 2024 at about 1:30 a.m. ransomware reached a management platform through the network, breached both security layers and encrypted 100% of the technological base - two physical and ten virtual servers per the MinTIC statement - forcing a precautionary network lockdown, manual clinical registration and a rebuild from redundant repositories; 95% of systems returned by 23 March at a cost above USD 250,000, while clinical care continued with minor adjustments. (3) This is a knowing-doing gap of the doctrinal-origin, execution-break kind: the formal strategic artefacts (layered security design, contingency plan) existed and were even executed well after detection, but the operational architecture did not realise their intent - a single foothold propagated to every server on-premises and in the cloud, so the design's containment promise was aspirational rather than built. No source shows leadership deferring, under-funding or dismissing anything, and recovery, detection and disclosure were demonstrably aligned, so the gap is in execution, not leadership, and not a purely material expertise gap (no known patch/MFA/config remedy is documented as left unexecuted). The classification rests on the entry stage (clearest evidence: the victim's own disclosure that the existing layered defences were breached), corroborated by the containment blast radius; the technical entry vector (how the platform was first reached) was not disclosed and is not load-bearing. RM28 (Strategy to Execution lens): malware-protection requirements were not implemented or enforced across the estate - the victim's own statement says malicious software breached both the primary and secondary security infrastructure, and a specialised provider later confirmed ransomware that had passed the hospital's security rings (causal role: Enabling). RM23 (Strategy to Execution lens): security and approval safeguards around management tooling were not realised - the foothold was a management platform reachable through the network, and encryption swept all twelve on-premises and cloud servers, so the blast radius equalled the platform's reach (causal role: Amplifying). RM30 (Strategy to Execution lens): the segmentation and isolation the two-tier design implies were not implemented in architecture and configuration - one compromise encrypted the entire technological infrastructure and the only effective containment was the precautionary shutdown of all network access (causal role: Amplifying).
RM28 — Endpoint / malware-protection gapRM23 — Management-tooling weaponisationRM30 — Segmentation / containment weaknessVictim as written in the case file is 'Caldas University Hospital'; the organisation's own statements identify it as S.E.S. Hospital Universitario de Caldas (Manizales). Data-quality: eurepoc_extra.start_date is 01.03.2024 while the dataset name, description and all reporting date the attack to 19.03.2024 (1:30 a.m.); Year 2024 is unaffected. The Russian origin and the ransomware-type finding rest on the hospital manager's statements (via a specialised provider, reported by La Patria); the EuRepoC row itself is 'Not attributed' and no group attribution is publicly confirmed, so the Actor stays unattributed. A Caracol report (28-03-24) claims a ransom demand of up to one billion pesos and data intended for sale, but that page returns 404 and no archived copy was found, so the claim is not cited and the dataset's no-exfiltration record is kept. The hospital's security-policy manual on its website is dated 26-09-2024 (after the incident) and was not used as evidence of the pre-breach state. No payment was reported; the hospital recovered from its own redundant repositories with MinTIC/ColCERT support. Link-check: the hospital's own statement pages now return 404 to automated fetchers, so both communiqués are cited via opened web.archive.org snapshots (20250624063506 and 20251108102125).