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Aliquippa Municipal Water Authority PLC intrusion (Cyber Av3ngers/IRGC-CEC, 2023)

2023 · United States · E - Water supply · OT intrusion via internet-exposed PLC (defacement, pump shutdown, no disruption)

Analysed 2026-11-06 by Hermes

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What happened

OT intrusion via internet-exposed PLC (defacement, pump shutdown, no disruption)

Dual vulnerability type

Expertise to Execution

Evidence coverage: 1/6 stages, weight 10/60

Decisive stage: entry (clearest evidence) · Alternative: Strategy to Execution

Why this classification

(1) The expectation at a US water utility designated critical infrastructure is basic OT exposure hygiene that the vendor and CISA had documented years before the intrusion: PLCs/HMIs must not sit on the public internet, default credentials (1111) must be replaced, and the default TCP port 20256 must not be used; CISA had even offered water utilities free vulnerability scans since September 2023. (2) In practice, on 25 November 2023 Cyber Av3ngers logged into the Unitronics Vision PLC/HMI of an Aliquippa booster station over the internet with default/no credentials on the default port, defaced the screen and stopped one pump; the station's own alarm fired, operators switched to manual operations, and containment (a separate, physically remote pump network), recovery (manual fallback) and the response (FBI/DEP/PSP notified, statements consistent with impact) all held - entry is the only stage with a documented victim-side gap and is where the classification rests. (3) That is a knowing-doing gap inside the material column: the remedy was known, cheap and documented expertise, not a strategy artefact, and it failed at the point where operations and architecture should have realised it; no source shows the authority's leadership aware of and deferring or under-resourcing it, so the break is execution, not leadership (the entry vector itself is fully documented here and is the decisive, load-bearing gap). RM27 (Expertise to Execution lens): the booster station's PLC/HMI was left unnecessarily exposed to the internet on its default TCP port 20256 - a documented, avoidable configuration exposure that operations had not eliminated (causal role: Enabling). RM22 (Expertise to Execution lens): the device accepted Unitronics default or no passwords, an organisational credential-management weakness the joint advisory names as the way the actors authenticated (causal role: Enabling). RM08 (Expertise to Execution lens): a small municipal authority running a mostly manual, 1930s-era plant sits in the sector CISA's own cybersecurity director described as structurally unable to keep up with securing such systems - a capability constraint that explains why the known remedy was never operationalised; this marker rests on sector-level evidence for the incident, not on the authority's own staffing records (causal role: Enabling).

Evidence by stage

Risk markers

Sources

Notes

EuRepoC codes functional impact as none, but the Beaver Countian (25-11-23, first report) says the attackers shut down one booster pump and workers relied on backup/manual methods to hold pressure until the system was taken offline; OFAC confirms no critical service was disrupted, so the impact coding is broadly consistent. First public disclosure was the attacker's Telegram post, though the victim detected the intrusion the same day via its own station alarm. CVE-2023-6448 (hard-coded default credentials) was assigned only after the intrusion (11-12-23), so no patch was outstanding at the time (RM18 not coded). The engineer's post-incident search for other Unitronics hardware in the system is scoping, not an evidenced asset-visibility deficiency (RM15 not coded). The December 2024 update of advisory AA23-335A (cited as PDF) footnotes the CBS News report of this incident; the original 01-12-23 version described the same default-password/internet-exposure mechanism. Case description matches the stated victim; no related rows in the case file.