2023 · Jordan · O - Public administration and defence · Internet outage caused by a cyber attack
Analysed 2026-11-06 by Hermes
Open this case in the tool →Internet outage caused by a cyber attack
No DV evidenced
Alternative: none defensible
(1) As the municipal administration of Jordan's capital, Greater Amman Municipality (GAM) is expected to keep its internal IT and its citizen e-services running, and Jordan's National Cybersecurity Center (NCSC) oversees incident response for public institutions. (2) On 31 August 2023 an electronic attack cut internet connectivity at GAM's main administrative building for less than 24 hours; the NCSC's head described the attack as simple, said it affected only the municipality's internal internet, that the incident was handled and connectivity restored to normal the same day, and that an investigation into the source of the attack was still under way; citizen e-services were never interrupted. (3) The classification cannot be made: the attack vector and source are undisclosed and were never established (the investigating authority itself stated the source was still under investigation), and no source documents a victim-side gap at any lifecycle stage with an answerable origin (doctrinal or material) and break (leadership or execution) - so no DV mechanism can be grounded. The entry vector is unknown and not load-bearing. This is also not No DV evidenced: the record is a single-day press statement plus one agency comment, nothing was reviewed about GAM's doctrine, and GAM's own statement that this outage was not the first it had dealt with is incompatible with a confirmed negative case; it shows the impact only. RM32 is recorded as the one condition the evidence does show, without claiming a DV mechanism.
RM32 — Capacity / availability-protection gapThin record: all Jordanian reporting (Ammon News, Al-Ghad, Nesan, Naba Jordan, Al-Wakeel via MENAFN) repeats GAM's same-day press statement; no follow-up investigation report, forensic findings or attribution were published. GAM's statement that the outage was not the first it had dealt with is the only hint of a recurring pattern, but earlier outages are not described in any source (they may not all be cyber incidents), so RM21 was not coded; the condition is noted here instead. The NCSC head's statements (attack was simple, only internal internet affected, restored the same day, source still under investigation) come from Al Wakeel News as republished by MENAFN. No data breach or exfiltration (EuRepoC intelligence_impact); disruption under 24h; actor unattributed. RM32 records only the observed condition that the main building's internet went down under attack; no DV mechanism is claimed for it. No consent-requiring research steps were needed or taken. Link check: alghad.com blocks automated access (HTTP 403); the page was opened and read during research.