2023 · Czech Republic · K - Financial and insurance activities · DDoS attack on public websites and online banking services
Analysed 2026-11-06 by Hermes
Open this case in the tool →DDoS attack on public websites and online banking services
No DV evidenced
Alternative: Expertise to Execution
(1) Strategic expectation: the five banks and the Prague Stock Exchange are critical-infrastructure finance entities whose customer-facing web and online-banking front ends must stay available, and the NoName057(16) DDoS threat against Czech targets was anticipated and known in advance - NÚKIB had been monitoring the group for a long time, proactively contacted the entities marked as targets and supplied mitigation recommendations for its HTTP GET/POST flood technique, and the adjacent state target (ČNB) stated it had prepared preventive measures in advance. (2) In practice: the 30 August 2023 flood temporarily degraded or took down public websites and internet/mobile banking (Komerční banka and Air Bank restored within roughly the morning, Fio before noon, ČSOB after 15:00, the exchange website shortly before 19:00; Česká spořitelna reported one hour of internet-banking problems for about a fifth of clients, with mobile banking up throughout). Internal systems, client accounts, funds and card/ATM rails were untouched, no data was accessed or lost, and NÚKIB recorded that none of the attacks in the campaign had longer-term consequences. (3) The lifecycle shows alignment rather than a dual vulnerability: the doctrinal layer (threat monitoring, advance guidance, availability obligations) demonstrably reached the victims, and execution realised it - each victim identified the flood that morning, mitigated it within hours, kept the blast radius at the public front end, and disclosed accurately and same-day with no contradiction between public statements and documented impact. No source documents a policy, warning, audit finding or available remedy that leadership or experts knew and left unexecuted at these victims, so the positive evidence of prepared, working mitigation supports No DV evidenced; the residual condition is simply that a high-volume flood temporarily exceeded front-end capacity (no DV-Type confidence distribution applies).
RM32 — Capacity / availability-protection gapRM21 — Recurring weakness / learning failureConditions behind the markers, no DV lens claimed: RM32 - the victim-side condition is that public web front ends and internet banking were temporarily unavailable or degraded under the HTTP flood (1 to 9 hours) despite mitigation capacity; RM21 - the availability disruption is a recurring condition at Czech banks: Check Point reported in the day-of coverage that NoName057(16) had attacked the Czech Republic many times before and had already hit banks, and NÚKIB's monthly report describes the August 2023 wave as the latest in a year of waves against Czech targets; the recurrence is documented at campaign level, not as one named bank's own unremediated incident. The row's own description is internally inconsistent (it says the outages temporarily restricted clients' monetary withdrawals and, one sentence later, that card payments and cash withdrawals remained uninterrupted); ČTK reporting says throughout that card payments and ATMs worked - the contradictory phrase likely comes from the low-quality aggregators in the row's source_url (sputnikglobe.com/tellerreport.com), which were not opened or cited. 'CSOB' in the victim field is ČSOB (Československá obchodní banka), a different bank from Česká spořitelna, so the five named banks are five distinct entities. Attribution rests on the group's self-claim on Telegram plus vendor analysis (Check Point, PwC, Avast, ESET) as reported in the opened press articles; the attacker's Telegram channel listed as the row's attribution_source_url was not opened, per the research-boundary policy on attacker channels. The same campaign continued after this date, hitting the Czech National Bank's website on 1 September 2023 (iROZHLAS); that institution is not among this row's victims. No regulator or formal investigation examined the incident, so the regulator-no-failings rule does not apply; the No DV evidenced reading rests on the positive alignment evidence named in the rationale. The English versions of NÚKIB's July and November 2023 monthly reports were looked for but are not at the expected URLs (HTTP 404) and are not cited. Link check: irozhlas.cz blocks automated access (HTTP 403); the page was opened and read during research. Link check: irozhlas.cz blocks automated access (HTTP 403); the page was opened and read during research.