2023 · Netherlands · O - Public administration and defence · DDoS attack causing temporary website outage
Analysed 2026-11-06 by Hermes
Open this case in the tool →DDoS attack causing temporary website outage
No DV evidenced
Alternative: none defensible
(1) Doctrinal expectation: the Dutch Senate and the Council for the Judiciary run publicly critical websites (rechtspraak.nl publishes rulings and court information; the parliament site served the state visit of President Zelenskyy on 4 May 2023) and are expected to keep them available under adversarial load. (2) What happened: on 4 May 2023 the public part of rechtspraak.nl was flooded with traffic and was poorly or not reachable, and the Staten-Generaal site was hard to reach due to overloading; the Council for the Judiciary filed a criminal report and said court proceedings were unaffected; the victim's own statement of 6 May 2023 says rechtspraak.nl was only made reachable again after several measures (maatregelen) had been taken. (3) Why the classification is Unknown: the reporting confirms impact only. It documents no victim-side gap that can be placed on the origin x break test - nothing shows a DDoS-protection requirement that was known and deferred, under-resourced or discounted (no leadership break evidenced), and nothing shows a decided, resourced protection that operations failed to realise (no execution break evidenced). Per the decision rule, impact-only confirmation without a victim-side mechanism yields Unknown; this is a short, symbolic hacktivist DDoS with low intensity and no data breach. The entry mechanism (volumetric flooding) is documented but is attacker-side context and not load-bearing for the DV assessment.
RM32 — Capacity / availability-protection gapAttribution lead not opened: the case file's source_url and attribution_source_url point to the attacker's Telegram channel (t.me/noname05716eng) and a ransomware-tracker tweet; per the research boundaries these were not visited, so the NoName057(16) attribution rests on self-attribution reported by secondary press (NL Times citing FalconFeeds.io) and the NCSC's statement that the overload fit the pattern of pro-Russian hacktivists; the Council for the Judiciary itself said on 4-6 May the attacker was unknown. Date discrepancy in the dataset: eurepoc_extra gives end_date 04.05.2023 and 'short-term disruption (< 24h)', while the victim's own statement of 6 May 2023 says the public site was poorly reachable since Thursday 4 May and was reachable again only after measures were taken. Earlier comparable weakness not coded: the Rechtspraak websites suffered an unattributed DDoS in November 2021 (victim statement, rechtspraak.nl 10-11-2021), but no source shows whether lessons from it were translated into changes, so the recurring-weakness marker was not coded. No consent-gated actions were taken (unattended run).