2011 · O - Public administration and defence · Cyber-espionage campaign with data theft (Remsec malware)
Analysed 2026-11-06 by Hermes
Open this case in the tool →Cyber-espionage campaign with data theft (Remsec malware)
No DV evidenced
Alternative: none defensible
(1) The case file describes a state-level cyber-espionage campaign by Strider/ProjectSauron (Remsec malware) against government, military, telecom and finance organisations in Russia, Belgium, China, Iran, Sweden and Rwanda, active from June 2011 to April 2016 (eurepoc_extra.start_date 01.06.2011; Kaspersky FAQ). The victims are recorded only as receiver categories - no individual victim organisation is named. (2) What the primary vendor reporting documents is the attacker's tradecraft and the confirmed impact (long-term espionage, theft of encryption keys and documents), not any victim-side condition: the initial infection vector 'remains unknown' per Kaspersky; core implants were custom-built per target so published indicators of compromise were of little use; the campaign was found only in September 2015 when Kaspersky's Anti-Targeted Attack Platform flagged anomalous traffic in a client network, and Symantec counted just 36 computers in seven organisations. (3) The multi-year undetected dwell time is explained by the sources entirely through attacker stealth (memory-only modules, per-target tooling, exfiltration blended into legitimate DNS and email traffic), not through any documented failure of a named victim's monitoring, policy or funding; no lifecycle stage - entry, containment, detection, egress, recovery or response - yields a defensible victim-side mechanism with an evidenceable origin and break, and the framework's unit of assessment (one victim organisation's situation) does not exist for this diffuse, multi-country state operation. This is therefore an atypical, state-on-state campaign: reporting confirms impact only, which the decision rule maps to Unknown. The entry vector is explicitly unknown and no later-stage victim evidence substitutes for it. (4) Skipped (Unknown): no risk marker is coded because no victim-side condition is evidenced for any of the affected organisations; conditions like the long dwell time are attributed by the sources to the actor's stealth, and stretching RM34 or RM35 onto unnamed victims across six countries would not clear their exclusion conditions.
Atypical, state-on-state case: a nation-state espionage campaign against government and critical-infrastructure targets in at least six countries; the case file carries no receiver_name, only receiver categories, so the victim is named descriptively and no single victim organisation exists in the framework's sense (basis for Unknown). Year taken from eurepoc_extra.start_date (01.06.2011, first year of the campaign); Country left null per the method-spec column convention for multi-organisation, multi-country campaigns. Sector coded O Public administration and defence because 'State institutions / political system' with 'Government / ministries' and 'Military' subcategories is the dominant receiver category in the row, though telecom and finance subcategories are also listed. Attribution unconfirmed: the case file records initiator_country Unknown with IT-security-community attribution; Kaspersky's CEO implied US involvement in 2017 but two former US intelligence officials disputed this (CyberScoop), and no state attribution has been established. Data-quality remark: the row's description lists Rwanda among the targets, but receiver_country in eurepoc_extra covers only Iran, Sweden, China, Russia and Belgium. The case file carries no related_rows. No consent-restricted action was needed for this unattended run.