2023 · Germany · C - Manufacturing · DDoS attack with brief website outage
Analysed 2026-11-06 by Hermes
Open this case in the tool →DDoS attack with brief website outage
No DV evidenced
Alternative: none defensible
(1) Rheinmetall is a critical-infrastructure-designated German defence supplier whose role in weapons deliveries to Ukraine made its public IT and internal systems a probable target; the group website was run by an external service provider, so an expectation of service continuity and of separation between the public web presence and internal IT applies to a company of this sector and criticality. (2) On Tuesday 7 March 2023 an attempted large-scale cyberattack - reported by WDR as a DDoS - left only the externally hosted group website temporarily unavailable (under 24 hours); the company said its IT infrastructure proved stable, that there was no indication of a breach of internal systems, and that no financial damage was expected, and it investigated the attack in coordination with the BSI. (3) The reporting confirms impact only: across entry, containment, detection, egress, recovery and response no source documents a victim-side gap whose expectation could be located (doctrinal or material) or whose chain-break could be located (leadership or execution) - nothing is reported on DDoS-protection capacity, on the provider arrangement, on any prior warning or on resourcing decisions - so no DV-Type can be placed on either axis and the Unknown decision rule applies; equally, no investigation or documentation of controls provides the positive evidence of doctrine-execution alignment that 'No DV evidenced' would require, so the outcome of the attack (internal IT unaffected) alone does not support that value either. RM32 is recorded as the one condition the evidence does show - the externally hosted group website did not keep availability under attack - but no source states why, so its origin and break cannot be answered from evidence; the volumetric DDoS technique is attacker-side context and is not the basis of the classification.
RM32 — Capacity / availability-protection gapDate discrepancy in the row: the title and description say 7 March 2022, but eurepoc_extra.start_date is 07.03.2023 and all reporting (dpa/heise, Cybernews, the cited SZ article - which notes Rheinmetall's DAX admission on that same Tuesday) dates the incident to 7 March 2023; the 2022 in the title is a dataset error and Year is set to 2023. Attribution: the EuRepoC row says Not attributed and no actor claimed the 7 March 2023 attack; pro-Russian collective Killnet had posted a call to attack Rheinmetall IP targets that day (context only, not attribution), and media/analysts suspected Russia-aligned hackers for motives tied to Ukraine weapons deliveries. The group website was operated by an external service provider; no source reports an assurance failure on that arrangement, so RM13 was not coded. Related row 1839 (Black Basta ransomware, detected April 2023) is a separate incident at the same victim; its case file is not present in cases-run500 and no comparable earlier weakness bears on this row (RM21 not coded). A separate, later NoName057(16) DDoS on 28 March 2023 is a different incident not carried in this row.