2018 · Poland · O - Public administration and defence · Phone hacking and covert surveillance with spyware
Analysed 2026-11-06 by Hermes
Open this case in the tool →Phone hacking and covert surveillance with spyware
No DV evidenced
Alternative: none defensible
(1) The expectation that applies at this victim was the general one for a local-government principal: that his personal mobile phone, used for political co-ordination, stays outside an adversary's reach and that any lawful surveillance of him would be ordered on a legal basis and, once finished, be visible to him. (2) In practice, per Gazeta Wyborcza's 2023 exclusive, Polish services logged into his phone at least 'a dozen times between November 2018 and March 2019' with NSO Group's Pegasus while he organised the opposition's 2019 Senate campaign; the Prokuratura Krajowa later stated (04-06-2025) that two former CBA officers initiated and ran operational controls against him, including with Pegasus, from November 2018 to May 2019 despite a lack of factual and legal grounds, and obtained court consents by misleading judges; what data left the phone could never be established because the device had been wiped and passed to another person, and Polish services have a statutory duty to destroy collected data but no duty to tell the surveilled person. He learned of the surveillance only in early 2023 via the Pegasus Project journalists, filed a criminal complaint and an application to the European Court of Human Rights (Karnowski v. Poland, no. 26531/23), and asked the services for information in vain. (3) This is not scored as a knowing-doing or doctrinal-material gap at the victim: entry was zero-click state-grade spyware (case file: user interaction None), for which no source documents a doctrinal expectation or an available material remedy that the victim side held and failed to act on; the undetected 2018-2023 dwell and the unscopeable exfiltration are the designed effect of the tool plus the perpetrator's data destruction, not a failure of any control the city of Sopot or Karnowski owned. The documented control failures all sit with the acting agency: the ABW post-inspection (via Prokuratura Krajowa, 06-05-2025) found the Pegasus system was never granted the ICT-security accreditation the classified-information act required, and the Sejm Pegasus commission found the tool was bought and run outside basic security rules. The DV framework assesses the victim organisation's own doctrine and execution; here the victim is an individual targeted by his own state's services, no lifecycle stage yields a victim-side mechanism, and reporting confirms impact only - the decision rule therefore gives Unknown. The entry vector, though known (zero-click Pegasus), is not load-bearing for a DV-Type and no stage can be named decisive. Atypical state-surveillance case.
Atypical case: unlawful state-directed spyware surveillance of an individual opposition politician by a state agency (CBA) - there is no victim-side knowing-doing gap to code, so DV-Type is Unknown and 0 risk markers are recorded (permitted range for Unknown); conditions such as the lack of any legal notification duty to a surveilled person and the wiped phone are described in the rationale, not stretched onto a marker. Period of the CBA's logins differs by source: Gazeta Wyborcza says a dozen logins between November 2018 and March 2019, the Prokuratura Krajowa charging statement says the operational controls ran from November 2018 to May 2019; Year taken as the start year 2018 per euRepoC start_date 01.11.2018. What data was exfiltrated was never established (phone wiped and given to another person), consistent with the case file note that no further details about the obtained data have been published. The case file's MITRE fields (Drive-By Compromise, zero_days Yes, user_interaction None) were treated as context only, per the core rule. Reuters returned only headline and lede to the extractor (bot-limited) and the link check could not verify it automatically: Link check: reuters.com blocks automated access; the page was opened and read during research. Link check: hudoc.echr.coe.int blocks automated access (HTTP 403); the page was opened and read during research. Sector taken as the victim's primary activity (municipality / mayor), not the acting agency's. No related_rows in the case file and no earlier result for this victim in the output directory. Case description matches the stated victim (no data-quality mismatch). Unattended run: nothing requiring consent was encountered.