2022 · Russia · O - Public administration and defence · Claimed data leak / doxing of GNSS-related screenshots and IP addresses, no disruption
Analysed 2026-11-06 by Hermes
Open this case in the tool →Claimed data leak / doxing of GNSS-related screenshots and IP addresses, no disruption
No DV evidenced
Alternative: none defensible
(1) The doctrinal expectation at a state-run satellite navigation system whose ground segment is Russian critical infrastructure with military use would be that its ground/user-segment interfaces are protected and their exposure controlled; no source documents any GLONASS-specific policy, control or knowledge. (2) What the evidence shows is an attacker-side disclosure only: on 17 March 2022 the account AnonGh0st tweeted that in the preceding two days the group had attacked the Russian GNSS satellite system and posted a pastebin link, complaining that others had stolen its leaks; the DarkOwl tracker logged the same event as screenshots shared as proof of attacks against a Trimble GNSS satellite interface and 48 IP addresses associated with the GNSS satellite systems, with the nature of the attacks not specified. The victim never acknowledged a breach, and the EuRepoC row itself records no system interference and only a minor leak. (3) No lifecycle stage yields a documented victim-side gap: the entry vector is unknown, containment, detection and recovery are entirely undocumented, and the only disclosure came from the attacker, so any DV-Type would rest solely on an unverified attacker claim rather than on an evidenced knowing-doing or doctrinal-material gap - the reporting confirms claimed impact only, and the decision rule (also atypical, hacktivist operation against a state target) sets DV-Type Unknown. A 2024 ETH Zurich CSS case study of cyber operations against the space sector in this war found that no hacktivist attack successfully targeted GNSS satellites in orbit, that most such operations hit websites, ground or user segments (mostly DDoS), and that it remains difficult to find additional proof these operations really took place; it also notes the IT Army listed GLONASS as a target without publicly claiming an attack on that target. The entry vector is unknown and not load-bearing.
Source-data duplication: Victim and receiver_name list the same victim twice (GLONASS; Russia;GLONASS; Russia); deduplicated here, country Russia from receiver_country. The existence of the incident rests solely on the attacker's own tweet (archived snapshot cited; the live tweet was not directly openable) and the DarkOwl tracker entry; the victim made no statement and no news outlet confirmed the leak, and no press follow-up, regulator or agency source was found. The leaked material sits behind a pastebin link which was not opened (research policy forbids handling leaked data). The live DarkOwl page no longer shows the 17-03-2022 GLONASS entry, so the 03-04-2022 Wayback snapshot that was opened and read during research is cited instead. The AnonGhost targeting choice fits the IT Army of Ukraine's early-March 2022 target list that included GLONASS (Reuters reporting, as carried by Cybernews and GPS World, opened during research). Related rows 228, 361, 3296 and 3414 concern other victims (CSTO website, Wagner group website, Bad Magic victims in Donetsk/Lugansk/Crimea, finance-sector DDoS) per their case-file titles; no earlier GLONASS incident among them. Case-file description matches the stated victim. Link check: gpsworld.com blocks automated access (HTTP 403); the page was opened and read during research.