2022 · Ukraine · O - Public administration and defence · Mass doxing / hack-and-leak information operation
Analysed 2026-11-06 by Hermes
Open this case in the tool →Mass doxing / hack-and-leak information operation
No DV evidenced
Alternative: none defensible
(1) The expectation the framework would need is a documented one at the victim organisations (Azov Battalion, SBU): e.g. an obligation to protect personnel records or a known remedy the organisations failed to execute. No source states any such expectation or gap. (2) What is documented is the attack side only: ISD's June 2022 analysis describes the Project Nemesis website and Telegram channel (launched 23 May 2022, built from mid-March 2022), the published personal details of hundreds of individuals including Azov Battalion members, the claim of 700 leaked SBU employees, and the Russian state-media amplification; it explicitly leaves the key questions open - ISD has not verified whether the SBU data is authentic, notes that only parts of the published data appear to come from internal records while others come from open sources such as social media profiles, and concludes that much remains unclear about who is responsible, their resources and the source of their information. Mandiant's May 2022 report likewise treats RaHDit as a newly emerged Russia-aligned hacktivist persona whose affiliation with the Russian state was then unknown. (3) Every lifecycle stage of the victims is therefore undocumented: no intrusion into Azov or SBU systems is verified (the SBU-employee-computer claim is the attackers' own, reported only via their Telegram post and Russian state media), and there is no victim disclosure, detection, containment or recovery record at all - the reporting confirms impact (personal data of named individuals published and harassment encouraged) only. Under the decision rule this is an atypical, information-warfare case: a hack-and-leak/doxing operation against military and intelligence personnel whose data provenance is unverifiable, not a documented organisational security failure at an identifiable victim, so the DV-Type is Unknown and confidence is null. The later US Rewards for Justice notice attributing RaHDit to an FSB officer confirms the state-linked nature of the campaign but adds nothing about a victim-side gap.
Atypical case flagged per the Unknown decision rule (hack-and-leak / mass-doxing information operation; the row's own description says the initiator has not been determined and ISD did not verify the claimed SBU hack). Source caveats: the case file's ISD source_url (…/digital_dispatches/project-nemesis-and-the-new-frontiers-of-informational-warfare/) returns 404 when fetched; the same dispatch under /digital-dispatch/project-nemesis-doxxing-and-the-new-frontier-of-informational-warfare/ opens and is cited instead. The case file's Mandiant source_url redirects to a generic Mandiant landing page; the report now lives at the cited cloud.google.com URL (linked from the ISD dispatch). Authenticity of the 700-SBU-employee data rests solely on attacker claims and Russian state media (RIA Novosti citing an unnamed security-service source); ISD did not verify it. RaHDit's later attribution to FSB officer Aleksey Garashchenko comes from the US Rewards for Justice notice. Related row 3393 is listed in the case file but its case file row-3393.json does not exist in cases-run500, so it could not be opened or researched; no statement is made about it. Country Ukraine from eurepoc_extra.receiver_country (both receivers Ukraine); Year 2022 from eurepoc_extra.start_date (01.03.2022). Sector O because both receivers are state military/intelligence institutions. Victim written as in the case file (two organisations); the description matches these victims (Azov Battalion and the SBU hack claim are named in it), so no data-quality mismatch.