2010 · United States, United Kingdom, Australia, Spain · R - Arts, entertainment and recreation · Coordinated DDoS campaign against industry websites
Analysed 2026-11-07 by Hermes
Open this case in the tool →Coordinated DDoS campaign against industry websites
No DV evidenced
Alternative: none defensible
(1) The strategic expectation cannot be pinned to a single victim: the row describes a decentralised hacktivist campaign (Operation Payback, September-November 2010), in which Anonymous supporters flooded the websites of anti-piracy and copyright bodies across the music and film industry with volumetric DDoS traffic announced in advance on 4chan and Twitter - MPAA, RIAA and IFPI in the US, BPI, ACS:Law and Ministry of Sound in the UK, AFACT in Australia, SGAE and Promusicae in Spain. There is no one organisation whose doctrine can be compared with its practice. (2) What the sources document is impact and restoration only: US sites were knocked offline temporarily and MPAA said it had taken measures; AFACT's site was inaccessible for several hours while the attack also took down close to 8,000 third-party sites on its hosting partner NetRegistry, which restored most connectivity in about 30 minutes; SGAE and the Spanish Culture Ministry were still offline on the second day after their hosting provider had been warned of the attack by PandaLabs. No data theft is coded for the row. (3) Because no source states any target organisation's policy, resourcing decision or expert knowledge about DDoS protection, no victim-side gap can be placed on the doctrinal-material axis or the knowing-doing axis at any of the six lifecycle stages: the reporting confirms impact only, and the entry technique (a Low Orbit Ion Cannon flood) is attacker-side and names nothing about the victims' internal alignment. Per the decision rule (no defensible victim-side mechanism; atypical diffuse multi-organisation campaign), the DV-Type stays Unknown. Two conditions that the evidence does show are recorded as risk markers without a DV lens: RM32 - the targeted public websites were saturated and knocked offline by a commodity flood that their hosting capacity could not absorb; RM04 - AFACT's site sat on a shared hosting platform whose single overload took down thousands of unrelated client websites, concentrating and amplifying the blast radius. A further sub-incident at one target (ACS:Law's site backup left publicly readable when the site returned, later leaked on P2P networks, per Ars Technica) is not coded by the row (data_theft: none) and is noted separately.
RM32 — Capacity / availability-protection gapRM04 — Control dependency concentrationData quality: the stated victim Anonymous Copyright Operation is the EuRepoC campaign/incident name (Operation Payback), not an organisation; receiver_category codes four corporate targets and the actual victims were multiple anti-piracy and entertainment-industry bodies in the US, UK, Australia and Spain (MPAA, RIAA, BPI, ACS:Law, Ministry of Sound, AFACT, SGAE). The Spanish Culture Ministry (a state body) was also hit per RTVE, although the row codes only corporate targets. Atypical, diffuse hacktivist campaign: no single victim organisation, so no DV-Type is assessed (see rationale); Country carries the four receiver countries from eurepoc_extra and Sector the primary targeted activity (music/film industry bodies). The row codes data_theft none and disruption under 24h; note that at target ACS:Law a site backup containing emails was exposed when the site came back online and leaked on peer-to-peer networks (Ars Technica), and SGAE was offline beyond 24h per RTVE - sub-incident details the row's coding does not cover. Dead leads: the three theregister.co.uk source URLs in the case file now return 404 after the site's restructure and web.archive.org rate-limited automated access (HTTP 429) during this research, so no snapshot could be opened and cited; the BBC, iTnews, RTVE and Ars Technica articles above were opened and read instead.