2022 · Israel · O - Public administration and defence · Denial-of-service attack on government websites
Analysed 2026-11-06 by Hermes
Open this case in the tool →Denial-of-service attack on government websites
No DV evidenced
Alternative: Expertise to Execution
(1) Israel runs a national cyber-defence programme (the state-funded Israel National Cyber Directorate, INCD) and the doctrinal expectation at the victim was that the public .gov.il web estate stays reachable: the state owns these services and the INCD publicly reports on, and warns about, the rising scale of attacks against Israeli targets. (2) In practice, on the evening of 14 March 2022 a massive, unattributed DDoS aimed at the telecom providers Cellcom and Bezeq rendered the .gov.il estate (Prime Minister's Office, interior, health, justice, welfare ministries) inaccessible for hours - the defence establishment called it the largest cyber attack ever carried out against Israel - while a consulting CEO quoted by the press put the flood at roughly 18:15-19:30 local time; domestic service was restored the same evening, international reachability remained degraded per NetBlocks, and there was no data theft. (3) The record documents impact and victim response, not a victim-side mechanism: the INCD identified the flood during the attack and disclosed it itself the same night, the Communications Ministry ran a situation assessment with the emergency services, a state of emergency was declared to scope damage and check critical infrastructure, and sites were back within hours. But no source states why the mitigation did not hold - no funding, deferral, ignored warning, policy-practice divergence or architecture decision is reported - so for the one misaligned stage (availability) the origin (doctrinal vs material) and break (leadership vs execution) cannot be answered from evidence; under the decision rule for rows where reporting confirms impact only, with cause undetermined, the DV-Type is Unknown. The volumetric DDoS vector is attacker-side and not load-bearing for a DV-Type. The row is not read as No DV evidenced because the availability outcome itself contradicts the expectation the doctrine exists to serve, and the record does not show why that outcome was within intended tolerance. (4) Skipped: lens sentences are not required for Unknown.
RM32 — Capacity / availability-protection gapRM04 — Control dependency concentrationEuRepoC row: unattributed (media-based attribution only), disclosed by the victim state's own authorities, disruption under 24h, weighted intensity 1, no data theft; the case-file description matches its stated victim. RM32 codes the documented condition that denial-of-service protection did not keep the .gov.il estate available under this flood; RM04 codes that the whole estate's reachability rode on two national telecom providers, so a flood aimed at Cellcom/Bezeq took down all government sites at once (and non-government sites too) - both recorded as conditions, without lens sentences, since the DV-Type is Unknown. NetBlocks reported the government network remained unreachable internationally after domestic restoration; no source states whether that was residual flood impact or deliberate international blocking as mitigation, so nothing is inferred from it. No public investigation or after-action report with victim-side findings was found in the searched sources. The case file carries no related_rows. No consent-gated actions were needed in this unattended run.