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IRIB broadcast hijack and wiper attack (PMOI / Predatory Sparrow, 2022)

2022 · Iran · J - Information and communication · Broadcast hijack (defacement) with wiper malware

Analysed 2026-11-07 by Hermes

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What happened

Broadcast hijack (defacement) with wiper malware

Dual vulnerability type

Strategy to Execution

Evidence coverage: 3/6 stages, weight 17/60

Decisive stage: containment (clearest evidence) · Alternative: Strategy to Leadership

Why this classification

(1) IRIB, the state monopoly on Iranian radio and television, ran its broadcast chain on the stated expectation that its technical and broadcasting systems were completely isolated from the Internet and protected by acceptable security protocols - a posture its own officials restated publicly on the day of the attack. (2) In practice, on 27 January 2022 attackers hijacked the live playout of Channel One and the Koran Channel and the Radio Javan and Radio Payam chains for a short broadcast of opposition leaders, and deployed custom backdoors and a wiper that destroyed files, master boot records, backups and Windows event logs on playout servers; Check Point, working from recovered forensic artifacts, documented that the attackers 'bypassed security systems and network segmentation' and assessed the damage as 'possibly more serious than officially reported', while the official account remained that of a 10-second hack. The initial access route is unknown and is not load-bearing for this classification. (3) The expectation that was not met is doctrinal - the victim's own official isolation/segmentation posture for its broadcast systems - and the chain broke at execution: that architecture was not realised in operational reality, so an intrusion reached the playout servers and the blast radius covered four channels with destructive payloads. This is the diagonal between formal isolation doctrine and actual IT reality, not merely weak security. The classification rests on the containment stage, the best-documented one; the response stage shows a secondary Strategy to Leadership pattern (the public account understating the documented destruction) and the detection stage shows weeks of undetected implant presence, but neither displaces the containment gap. RM30 (Strategy to Execution lens): the isolation the organisation publicly claimed was not implemented in architecture and configuration - Check Point documents the bypassing of network segmentation and the running of hijack tooling and a wiper on the playout and radio servers, so the blast radius spanned two TV channels and two radio chains (causal role: Amplifying). RM34 (Strategy to Execution lens): monitoring and alert-handling requirements around the playout environment were not operated as intended - the ServerLaunch dropper was compiled almost two months before the attack and the attackers stayed under the radar during reconnaissance and initial intrusion, the breach surfacing only when the video went on air (causal role: Obscuring). RM39 (Strategy to Execution lens): the criteria for an accurate incident account were not operationalised - IRIB disclosed on the day, but its official framing of a 10-second hack sat against forensic evidence of wiper destruction that Check Point assessed as possibly more serious than officially reported (causal role: Constraining). RM44 (Strategy to Execution lens): the specific public claim that the technical and broadcasting systems are completely isolated and not accessible via the Internet was materially contradicted by the documented intrusion into exactly those systems, so the stated commitment was not translated into the controls it described (causal role: Predisposing or obscuring).

Evidence by stage

Risk markers

Sources

Notes

Attribution contested: the victim (deputy technical head Reza Alidadi/Ali Dadi) attributed the attack to PMOI/MEK, which denied involvement; Predatory Sparrow claimed responsibility via Telegram without technical proof (Check Point). The attacker Telegram channel (t.me/GonjeshkeDarande) in the case file was not opened per the security policy (attacker channel); the claim is cited as reported by Check Point/CyberScoop. The digitaltveurope.com source_url now redirects to the Light Reading homepage and the Bloomberg article is paywalled, so neither is cited. The scale of destruction beyond official reporting rests on attacker/opposition-affiliated claims (600+ servers, 12 days) that Check Point could not verify. Related rows: row 437 (Edaalate Ali IRINN broadcast hijack, 8 Oct 2022) is a later, separate incident at the same victim - its case file was opened; row 211's case file is not present in the case folder, so nothing is stated about it; no earlier comparable unremediated weakness is documented before 27-01-2022, so no recurring-weakness marker is coded. Link check: reuters.com blocks automated access (HTTP 401); the page was opened and read during research.