2021 · M - Professional, scientific and technical activities · Cyber-espionage intrusion via software supply-chain compromise
Analysed 2026-11-07 by Hermes
Open this case in the tool →Cyber-espionage intrusion via software supply-chain compromise
No DV evidenced
Alternative: none defensible
(1) The row describes two 2021 Lazarus Group intrusions using an updated DeathNote cluster: the first against a South Korean think tank, reached through legitimate South Korean security software that executed a malicious payload, and the second against an IT asset monitoring vendor in Latvia, targeted because of its widely used software or customer base; the strategic expectation at both victims was ordinary assurance over trusted software and supplier channels. (2) What the sources actually document is attacker tradecraft, not victim-side conditions: Kaspersky's Q3 2021 APT trends report and its 2023 DeathNote campaign write-up describe the infection chains (a Racket downloader signed with a stolen certificate, the BLINDINGCAN backdoor delivering COPPERHEDGE in memory, and compromised vulnerable web servers used as C2 infrastructure), and Kaspersky researcher Ariel Jungheit stated, as reported by Dark Reading, that the firm did not have visibility into how Lazarus compromised either organisation, could not confirm that the Latvian vendor's own software products were tampered with, and could not determine whether downstream customers were reached. (3) No lifecycle stage yields a documented victim-side gap with an origin and a break: the compromise method of the entry stage is explicitly undetermined by the primary source (so it cannot carry a DV-Type), containment, detection and recovery are undocumented (Kaspersky and a local CERT, not the victims, acted on the intrusion), the case file codes data theft none, disruption none and hijacking not used (weighted intensity 1), so the egress stage is not in play, and the disclosure came from an IT-security company while the victims stayed silent - third-party disclosure of an espionage intrusion is normal practice in this actor space and by itself evidences no notification failure. A DV-Type drawn from the supply-chain technique would be the rejected form of reasoning (attacker used technique X, therefore DV-Type Y), and no source states anything about either victim's policies, decisions or operations; the case is therefore Unknown on insufficient victim-side evidence. The crossed third-party / supply-chain trust boundary is documented context and is described here rather than coded as a risk marker, because no victim-side assurance or monitoring failure is evidenced for it.
Data quality: the victim as written in the case file is not an organisation - the name field says "DeathNote cluster", which is Kaspersky's name for the Lazarus malware cluster (per its 2023 report, "the malware responsible for downloading additional payloads is named Dn.dll or Dn64.dll"), while the description identifies the actual targets: "a think tank in South Korea and the second an IT asset monitoring vendor", neither named in the case file. Multi-victim row: receiver_country is "Korea, Republic of;Korea, Republic of;Latvia;Latvia" covering two organisations in two countries, so Country is left null (no single victim country); Sector is set to M for the first-named victim (the think tank) as one value is required - the second victim, an IT asset monitoring vendor, would map to J. All evidence comes from Kaspersky threat reports and press reporting based on them; no victim statement, regulator action or court document was found, and the Korean-language coverage (Yonhap) only relays the Kaspersky report. Kaspersky stated (via Dark Reading): "We did not have visibility into how Lazarus compromised the South Korean security software company nor the asset monitoring technology provider in Latvia." Victim organisations are specific but unnamed, so victim established is true on the reporting while the Victim column keeps the dataset's own label. The usa.kaspersky.com press-release URL in the case file could not be opened during research and is not cited.