2010 · O - Public administration and defence · Cyber-espionage data theft campaign against government institutions
Analysed 2026-11-07 by Hermes
Open this case in the tool →Cyber-espionage data theft campaign against government institutions
No DV evidenced
Alternative: Expertise to Execution
(1) The row is a campaign-level EuRepoC entry: it has no receiver_name and covers hundreds of compromised government, military and intelligence computers in Venezuela, Ecuador, Colombia, Peru, Cuba, Spain, Russia and other countries, so no single victim organisation's doctrinal expectation can be established from the sources. (2) What the sources document is the campaign: a Spanish-speaking group running cyber-espionage since 2010 via spear-phishing (decoys built from real documents previously stolen from the targets) and fake blogs, exfiltrating documents, keystrokes, audio, screenshots and webcam images to C2 servers (Kaspersky); Cylance identified over 300 unique victims and over 100 GB of exfiltrated data in one month in 2017 and noted that "many of these indicators should have allowed defenders to reliably identify this threat", yet AV detection rates stayed very low; ESET still found in 2019 that over 75% of active victims were Venezuelan government institutions, with some victims never realising they were compromised and being re-compromised after the group changed C2 servers. (3) The victim-side conditions are reported only as collective statements by the three security vendors about an unnamed defender population, not as mechanisms inside one organisation: ESET blames "the targeted organizations" that "failed in raising awareness and applying security policies so that employees don't fall for these attacks in the first place", and Cylance suggests the targeted countries "have yet to fully mature and develop their own internal cyber capabilities". No source documents where the expectation sat (doctrinal or material) or where the chain broke (leadership or execution) for any identified victim, so no lifecycle stage yields a defensible organisation-level mechanism and the decision rule gives Unknown (atypical case: diffuse multi-country state-espionage campaign with no single victim organisation in the framework's sense). The entry vector is documented (spear-phishing, no zero-days) but is attacker-side context and not load-bearing for a DV-Type. Read against a named victim organisation, the same evidence would point to a known-remedy-not-executed gap (Expertise to Execution); group-level attribution does not carry that claim.
RM24 — Human-factor / social-engineering susceptibilityRM34 — Monitoring / detection / alert-handling gapData quality: the case file has no receiver_name and its name field 'ElMachete' is the EuRepoC campaign label; the Victim is recorded as written in the case file per the task, but the actual victims are hundreds of government, military and intelligence computers across the eight countries in the row (later reporting also lists telecommunications and power companies). Country left null: the victim population spans 8 states (Venezuela, Ecuador, Spain, Russia, Cuba, Colombia, Peru in the row; further countries in Cylance's 2017 set) - a diffuse multi-organisation campaign, not guessed per the method convention. Sector 'O Public administration and defence' reflects the row's receiver categories (government/ministries, military, intelligence agencies). Actor attribution is technical-report based: Kaspersky places Spanish-speaking roots; Cylance speculates the operators are Brazilian because victims cluster in Brazil's neighbours and no Brazilian victims were found; EuRepoC records initiator_country Brazil with attribution by the IT-security community. Cylance's observation that targeted states had yet to mature internal cyber capabilities is its own inference from the FinFisher/Hacking Team customer lists; it is described in the rationale but not coded as RM08. RM24 and RM34 are coded because ESET names the organisational condition (awareness and security policies not applied) and Cylance documents the multi-year undetected run despite published indicators; no single victim organisation is identified, consistent with DV-Type Unknown. Kaspersky's full analysis was customer-only (Kaspersky Intelligent Services); the public report is its public account. No victim-government statement, regulator notice or law-enforcement action was found despite searching in English and Spanish; disclosure was by IT-security companies (EuRepoC: 'Incident disclosed by IT-security company'). Note: the securityaffairs article dates Kaspersky's discovery to 2014 while the campaign description in the case file says the campaign started in 2010 (start_date 01.01.2010; Year 2010 follows the case file and both vendor reports).