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The Flame espionage malware campaign (Unknown state-sponsored actor, 2010)

2010 · O - Public administration and defence · Cyber-espionage via a state-sponsored malware campaign

Analysed 2026-11-06 by Hermes

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What happened

Cyber-espionage via a state-sponsored malware campaign

Dual vulnerability type

No DV evidenced

Alternative: none defensible

Why this classification

(1) The row describes no single victim organisation: 'The Flame' is the name of the malware toolkit itself, and the affected population is diffuse - Kaspersky reports victims ranging from individuals to state-related organisations and educational institutions, roughly 1,000 machines, with the large majority of targets in Iran and infections also reported in Palestine, Sudan, Syria, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and Egypt; a doctrinal expectation can therefore not be pinned to any organisation in the framework's sense. (2) What the record documents is the attacker's toolkit, not a victim lifecycle: Kaspersky found Flame in May 2012 while investigating the Wiper deletions at the request of the UN's ITU, and dates the campaign to at least February-March 2010; the toolkit (about 20 MB, some 20 modules) sniffed network traffic, took screenshots, recorded audio and keystrokes and harvested Bluetooth contacts, exfiltrating via covert SSL channels to around 80 command-and-control domains; Kaspersky states the initial point of entry is unknown (it suspected but could not confirm the MS10-033/printer-vector exploits); Iran's MAHER CERT said none of 43 tested anti-virus products detected the components, had built its own detector and removal tool by early May 2012, and Iran's foreign ministry attributed the attack to unnamed foreign actors. (3) This is the atypical, state-on-state case the decision rule reserves 'Unknown' for: the reporting confirms impact only. Across all six lifecycle stages no source documents a victim-side origin-break chain - entry vector unknown and never established; no source describes any victim organisation's containment architecture; the multi-year non-detection is an ecosystem-wide failure against a novel, tightly targeted evasion tool (the exclusion conditions of the endpoint-protection and patch-latency markers), not a documented gap in any one organisation's monitoring; no victim's egress governance, backup posture or disclosure decisions are reported. There is no knowing-doing or doctrinal-material gap that can be attributed to an organisation, so DV-Type is Unknown with no confidence score and no stage distribution. The entry vector is unknown and not load-bearing.

Sources

Notes

Data quality: the case file carries no receiver_name and the row's stated victim 'The Flame' is the incident/malware name, kept as written in the task; the actual victim population is diffuse (government ministries and end users per receiver_category, in Iran, Palestine, Sudan, Syria, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and Egypt, the large majority of infections in Iran). Country left null: the method spec blanks the country for unspecified/multi-organisation campaigns and this row lists seven receiver countries; Year 2010 from eurepoc_extra.start_date, matching Kaspersky's dating of the campaign to at least February-March 2010. Sector coded O because Government/ministries is the only victim category the row itself names. Attribution in the Actor field is the press/vendor picture (Kaspersky: nation state, authors unknown; Wikipedia summarising 2012 Washington Post reporting of a US/Israeli programme and a later Equation Group link) - attribution is contested and does not affect the victim-side assessment. euRepoC lists zero_days: Yes; Kaspersky had not confirmed a zero-day at Q&A time but noted fully-patched Windows 7 infections. No related_rows in the case file. No risk marker coded: the conditions the sources do show (multi-year AV evasion of a novel targeted toolkit, unknown entry vector) fall under the exclusion clauses of RM28 and RM18, and no organisation-specific gap is documented for any other marker.