2019 · India, Afghanistan · O - Public administration and defence · Cyber-espionage campaign (data theft and system misuse)
Analysed 2026-11-06 by Hermes
Open this case in the tool →Cyber-espionage campaign (data theft and system misuse)
No DV evidenced
Alternative: none defensible
(1) Strategic expectation at the victim: the targets are military institutions and military personnel in India and Afghanistan whose communications and documents are intelligence-relevant (internal government communications, travel information, military imagery per the Lookout report's analysis of exfiltrated content; Kaspersky's telemetry counted over a thousand distinct victims in 27 countries, mainly India and Afghanistan, June 2019 to June 2020); no source documents any doctrinal expectation, policy or control at a named victim organisation, so none can be evidenced. (2) What happened in practice: the Pakistan-linked group Transparent Tribe ran a long-running espionage campaign against these military targets using spear-phishing with malicious documents, trojanized fake apps and a USB worm, exfiltrating documents, credentials, keystrokes, audio and imagery; the campaign was documented and disclosed by IT-security companies (Lookout in May 2018, Kaspersky in August 2020), not by the victims. (3) Why this is Unknown rather than a DV-Type: the framework requires a concrete, verifiable victim-side failure point on one of the axes at a specific organisation. The record confirms impact and the attacker's TTPs only: the entry methods (phishing lures, fake app stores, USB worm spread) are attacker-side technique, which the core rule rejects as a classification basis, and no source states anything about the victims' detection, containment, egress monitoring, recovery or response - whether the intrusions were ever noticed at unit level is not recorded; the CFR Cyber Operations Tracker lists the victim government reaction for this actor's targeting of Indian government and military officials as Unknown. The victims are also diffuse (many individuals and units across two states' militaries), so no single organisation's doctrine-versus-practice situation can be assessed. Any origin/break answer here would rest solely on the coder's own inference, which the method excludes. The row's described incident matches the sources; nothing else at these victims was found that could substitute.
Source caveats: the two cited vendor reports describe the actor, not the victims - Lookout's Stealth Mango report (May 2018) is based on leaked attacker infrastructure and finds its largest victim set among Pakistani government and military officials with spillover to India, Afghanistan, Iraq and the UAE, while the India/Afghanistan military focus stated in the row is what Kaspersky's Crimson telemetry (June 2019-June 2020) confirms; the row's description is consistent with both. Disclosure: by IT-security companies (eurepoc_extra.source_disclosure); no statement, CERT/regulator finding or recovery/response record from India or Afghanistan was found in the searched record. Country: multi-victim row - both values of receiver_country are recorded ('India; Afghanistan'); Year from eurepoc_extra.start_date (01.01.2019). Data quality: no receiver_name in the row; victim named descriptively per case-field convention. Related row: row 1477 (same initiator, compromise of Afghan government networks opened and read during this task; case file and existing result reviewed) is likewise Unknown for the same evidence reason; it is a separate, later incident, not merged here. Set to Unknown because the sources confirm impact and attacker TTPs only and document no victim-side mechanism at any lifecycle stage.