2019 · Russia · K - Financial and insurance activities · Cyber-espionage via spear-phishing with macro documents dropping a backdoor
Analysed 2026-11-06 by Hermes
Open this case in the tool →Cyber-espionage via spear-phishing with macro documents dropping a backdoor
No DV evidenced
Alternative: none defensible
(1) No doctrinal expectation can be established at the victim, because the victims are not identifiable: the case file carries no receiver_name (receiver_category: corporate targets only) and Check Point's report, the sole primary source, describes only 'Russian-based companies' attacked in late January 2019; Dark Reading quotes the researcher saying there is not enough information to know whether the attacks were directed at a single company or different entities. (2) What the record documents is entirely the attacker's side: at least three spear-phishing attacks in the last week of January 2019 using malicious Word/Excel documents (decoys such as a StarForce NDA and a Los Angeles court report, Cyrillic lures with Korean code pages) whose macros downloaded a VBS script and then the KEYMARBLE backdoor (already described in US-CERT's August 2018 report) from a compromised server in Iraq; data theft and system misuse followed via the backdoor's reconnaissance commands. (3) The campaign was surfaced externally - malicious documents uploaded to VirusTotal from Russian sources in the week of 26-31 January, analysed by Check Point (euRepoC: incident disclosed by an IT-security company) - and no victim statement, notification, forensic account, regulator action or recovery reporting exists for any attacked company. The DV framework requires a documented victim-side gap (an expectation or known remedy that failed to reach execution or leadership); here reporting confirms impact only, no lifecycle stage of an identifiable victim organisation is documented, and reasoning from the attacker's use of previously used tools and evasive packaging would be the rejected 'attacker used technique X' inference. This is therefore Unknown for insufficient evidence (diffuse multi-organisation campaign, victims undisclosed), not No DV evidenced - there is no positive evidence of alignment either. The observation that the samples surfaced via VirusTotal rather than victim monitoring hints at a possible detection gap but cannot be attributed to any named organisation and is not coded.
Unknown (insufficient evidence): the record is a threat-intelligence campaign report (Check Point, 19-02-2019) plus derivative press (Dark Reading, SecurityWeek, Infosecurity Magazine, BleepingComputer); all describe the attacker's TTPs and confirm impact (data theft, backdoor access) but none names a victim or documents any victim-side lifecycle stage, so no DV-Type is defensible and no confidence score is issued. Victim not established: euRepoC carries no receiver_name, the description says only 'Russian companies', and Check Point itself could not say whether one company or several were hit; the victim is therefore named descriptively and 'victim established' is false. Sector: the output check requires exactly one CBS SBI entry, but the reporting never firmly identifies the victims' sectors - this is a diffuse multi-target campaign with no named organisation. It is coded K (Financial and insurance activities) on the strength of Infosecurity Magazine, which reports the campaign as an attack on financial institutions in Russia, consistent with the attribution to the monetisation-focused Bluenoroff; treat the sector as a reporting-based approximation, not an established fact. Attribution (Lazarus/Bluenoroff, DPRK RGB) rests on tool and infrastructure reuse (KEYMARBLE per US-CERT AR18-221A, a previously used drop server) as reported by Check Point; SecurityWeek notes the false-flag question was left open - attribution caveats apply but do not affect the DV reading, which fails on the victim side. The dataset description 'attacked Russian companies with previously used tools' matches the sources (previously described KEYMARBLE variant, previously used drop zone); no description-victim mismatch found. Country from eurepoc_extra.receiver_country (Russia); Year from eurepoc_extra.start_date 01.01.2019 - the observed phishing wave ran 26-31 January 2019, disclosure 19 February 2019. Unattended run: no consent-gated actions (no leak-site, dump or leak-site-adjacent source was consulted; IOCs and malware details were not followed).