2019 · Iran · O - Public administration and defence · State cyberattack with data destruction and system disruption
Analysed 2026-11-06 by Hermes
Open this case in the tool →State cyberattack with data destruction and system disruption
No DV evidenced
Alternative: none defensible
(1) The strategic expectation the framework would need is the victim organisation's own security doctrine or known remedies; none is documented, because the incident is a covert US Cyber Command operation against the Iranian military (an IRGC intelligence group whose database was used to select oil tankers for attack), conducted in an undeclared state-on-state cyber conflict. (2) What happened in practice is known only from the attacker's side: senior US officials briefed the New York Times in August 2019 that the June 20, 2019 strike wiped out a critical IRGC database and took military communications systems offline, with effects lasting longer than intended and data never recovered; Iran publicly denied being successfully attacked, and neither government ever officially acknowledged the operation. (3) The entry vector, detection, containment, egress and recovery conditions inside the IRGC are undocumented - there is no victim-side disclosure, investigation or policy record at any lifecycle stage, and the impact account is an unverified attacker claim - so no knowing-doing or doctrinal-material gap can be placed on any axis. This is an atypical, attacker-side case (a state cyber operation against a foreign military target, analogous to the method's law-enforcement-takedown rule): there is no victim organisation in the framework's sense, hence DV-Type Unknown with no assessable mechanism.
Atypical, attacker-side state operation: disclosed solely through anonymous US officials quoted by the New York Times (case file: incident disclosed by attacker, attribution basis attacker confirms); never officially acknowledged by the US, and Iran's ICT minister publicly denied any successful attack (reported by The Hill). All impact claims (database wiped, effects longer than expected, data not recovered) are attacker-side statements, not victim-side evidence. Date caveat: the case file gives start_date 01.07.2019 while the New York Times places the strike on June 20, 2019; Year follows the reporting (2019). Data quality: the victim name in the dataset reads USA cyberattack against Iranian military, with USA as a typo for US; the description (American military shut down an Iranian database used to target oil tankers) is consistent with the stated victim. The earlier missile-target reports were corrected: senior US officials said reports that the hack targeted missile-launch systems were inaccurate (New York Times via Times of Israel; Lawfare). Link check: nytimes.com blocks automated access (HTTP 403); the page was opened and read during research. Link check: timesofisrael.com blocks automated access (HTTP 403); the page was opened and read during research. Link check: thehill.com blocks automated access (HTTP 403); the page was opened and read during research.