2018 · Cyprus, Greece, Iraq, Albania, Turkey · O - Public administration and defence · State-backed DNS hijacking campaign with credential theft
Analysed 2026-11-06 by Hermes
Open this case in the tool →State-backed DNS hijacking campaign with credential theft
Expertise to Execution
Evidence coverage: 1/6 stages, weight 6/60
Decisive stage: detection (clearest evidence) · Alternative: Strategy to Leadership
(1) Strategic expectation at the victims: state institutions whose email and admin portals were targeted were expected, per the technical state of the art during the campaign, to know and control their own published DNS resolution paths - NCSC and CISA had published precisely this mitigation set (audit public DNS records, protect the accounts that can change them, monitor certificate issuance). (2) In practice, the hijacked DNS records of at least 30 organisations across Cyprus, Greece, Iraq, Albania and Turkey were identified by Reuters and private cybersecurity firms reviewing public DNS records, not by the victims; Team Cymru notified some of the victims; the campaign had run since early 2018 and was still ongoing when reported in January 2020; at Albanian state intelligence hundreds of usernames and passwords were captured before the campaign became public. (3) This is a gap within the material column, not mere weak security: the remedy was available, published technical knowledge, and it was not realised in operational practice - the affected organisations' operations did not notice a resolution path that had been hijacked and was visible in public records for roughly two years, and the chain broke at execution because nothing in the sources shows any of the affected organisations had taken the monitoring decision away from technical teams (no leadership decision or deferral is documented anywhere for this diffuse victim set). The classification rests on the detection stage, the only stage with a documented victim-side gap; it is not derived from the attacker's entry technique: DNS resolution was altered upstream of the victims and no entry-stage victim-side failure is documented, so the entry vector is not load-bearing. A secondary pattern at the response stage (Cyprus claiming its agencies were immediately aware, against the overall external-discovery picture) is named but not load-bearing. RM15 (Expertise to Execution lens): the technical teams of the affected organisations could not protect or respond on their own externally visible exposure path - DNS resolution of their services - because its state was unknown to them, with login traffic resolving to impostor sites unnoticed for about two years (causal role: Enabling). RM34 (Expertise to Execution lens): monitoring against DNS-record tampering was absent or untuned at the affected organisations - the incident surfaced through external parties (Team Cymru, private security firms, Reuters) working from public records rather than through the victims' own detection or alert handling (causal role: Obscuring).
RM15 — Asset / exposure visibility gapRM34 — Monitoring / detection / alert-handling gapData quality: the case file names no individual victim and labels the row 'Turkish DNS hack'; the Victim cell is therefore a descriptive naming of the receivers the dataset and the source article identify (Cyprus and Greek government email services, the Iraqi national security adviser, Albanian state intelligence, Turkish civilian organisations); description and victim set are consistent, no mismatch. Country is the unique set of eurepoc_extra.receiver_country (Cyprus, Greece, Iraq, Albania, Turkey) and Year is the eurepoc_extra.start_date year, as the procedure prescribes for EuRepoC rows; no single victim organisation owns the row, so Sector reflects the dominant receiver category (state institutions). Attribution rests solely on unnamed Western security officials quoted in one Reuters report (January 2020); nearly all other coverage is a republication of that article - no formal government advisory, legal or political response documents this specific campaign (searched: CISA/NCSC/CERT angles). The NCSC advisory is cited only as sector-level evidence of the expected mitigations at the time, not as documentation of these incidents. The officials told Reuters the campaign was unrelated to the similar-technique campaign uncovered in late 2018; secondary commentary (FDD) nevertheless links it to the Sea Turtle campaign on overlapping victimology - Sea Turtle-specific findings (e.g. the .gr registry intrusion reported by Kathimerini, the Packet Clearing House disclosure) were deliberately not used as evidence for this row. Separate incidents at overlapping victims, not used for the classification: the January 2020 DDoS wave claimed by the Turkish nationalist group Anka Neferler Tim (a Kathimerini probe found no data stolen), the subsequent reporting of outdated Greek e-government protection systems, and a Turk Telekom DNS-style attack FDD could not tie to the campaign. All cited URLs opened and read during this task. Link check: reuters.com blocks automated access (HTTP 401); the page was opened and read during research. Link check: fdd.org blocks automated access (HTTP 403); the page was opened and read during research.