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South Korea Presidential Office (Blue House) DDoS attack (Japanese netizens, 2010)

2010 · Korea, Republic of · O - Public administration and defence · DDoS attack (hacktivist retaliation)

Analysed 2026-11-07 by Hermes

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What happened

DDoS attack (hacktivist retaliation)

Dual vulnerability type

No DV evidenced

Alternative: Expertise to Execution

Why this classification

(1) Strategic expectation at the victim: the presidential office's public website, a symbol target in a Korea-Japan netizen conflict that had recurred on symbolic dates since 2001 and whose retaliation had been publicly planned and press-previewed for days, was expected to stay available under a crude, foreseeable DDoS. (2) What happened in practice: on 1 March 2010 more than 10,000 Korean netizens paralyzed 30 of 2ch's 33 boards (Yonhap, 1 March); that evening from about 6 pm Japanese 2channel users retaliated against the Blue House and VANK sites. VANK's homepage was unreachable for about an hour but was mitigated through a professional security firm, while the Blue House site experienced only a modest access delay around 7 pm; a presidential office official stated that traffic had not increased substantially and access had no serious problem (Yonhap, 1 March, 20:03). There was no data theft and the case file records short-term disruption below 24 hours with zero economic impact. The entry technique - mass browser refreshes - is disclosed but not load-bearing. (3) Why this is 'No DV evidenced' and not a gap: across the six lifecycle stages the reviewed sources positively show alignment at the victim - the attack was foreseen and monitored, the service stayed available under it, recovery was not a constraint, and the victim's own same-day account matches the documented impact, which is the positive evidence of doctrine-execution alignment the confirmed-negative case requires (it is not merely an absence of bad news). The one condition the evidence does show sits in the wider environment: the national cyber agency KISA had predicted on 26 February that the conflict would calm and, while the retaliatory attacks were already under way, said none had been reported, and the press criticised the government for failing to grasp a situation that had been publicly planned for a week (Digital Times, 1 March). That is coded as RM05 as a threat-assessment blind spot of the supporting agency, not as a failing of the presidential office's own controls, which is why the DV-Type stays 'No DV evidenced'. RM32 marks the concrete condition at the victim itself: a crude, publicly announced DDoS did momentarily degrade availability of the national website, though the protection held at minor-impact scale. No regulator or formal investigation reviewed the incident; the assessment rests on same-day wire and IT-press reporting.

Risk markers

Sources

Notes

Dataset caveats: the EuRepoC row carries no receiver_name; the victim is derived from the description ('Website of the South Korea's Presidential Office'), which matches the source article. The row's eurepoc_extra.start_date (01.03.2009) contradicts the row's own source article - a Korea Times piece of August 2010 saying the 2ch attack and the Blue House retaliation happened 'last March', on the 91st anniversary of the March 1st Movement and the closing day of the Vancouver Winter Olympics, i.e. 1 March 2010; Year is therefore set to 2010. Attribution is by self-claim in the course of the attack (loose 2channel-user crowd, partly uncoordinated; some reports say a few domestic participants joined - Wikipedia mentions this and that the Blue House shortly blocked Japanese IPs, neither used as a citation here). No victim investigation, regulator or CERT report exists for this incident; the classification rests on same-day Yonhap and Digital Times reporting plus the dataset's impact fields. The Digital Times criticism of the government addresses the handling of the netizen conflict as a whole; RM05 is scoped to that documented KISA threat-assessment miss, not to the presidential office's own controls.