2018 · Italy · O - Public administration and defence · Cyber-espionage via targeted malware campaign
Analysed 2026-11-06 by Hermes
Open this case in the tool →Cyber-espionage via targeted malware campaign
No DV evidenced
Alternative: none defensible
Unknown - atypical, attacker-side. The entire public record of Operation Roman Holiday is a third-party malware analysis: Z-Lab at CSE Cybsec and an independent researcher found the samples in online sandboxes/VirusTotal and published hashes, C2 infrastructure and Yara rules. No lifecycle stage of the victim yields a defensible victim-side mechanism: entry vector is undisclosed; nothing is documented about containment, detection or dwell time (the campaign was surfaced by external researchers, not by any disclosed victim detection); data theft is only an intensity scoring in the EuRepoC row with no reported material; recovery is not in play (no disruption, has_disruption False); and neither the Marina Militare nor the Ministero della Difesa ever disclosed, confirmed or commented on the incident. Even the targeting itself is inferred: the report says the C2 domain marina-info.net led the researchers into speculating about the Marina Militare, that they cannot exclude subcontractors or other associated entities, and that they could not directly connect the DLL to the X-Agent samples. Reading a detection or endpoint gap from the report's observation that the sample had a 0/65 detection rate would be inferring a victim-side failure about systems whose compromise is itself unconfirmed - the method rejects attacker-side reasoning of that kind. Per the decision rule, when reporting documents the campaign only and no lifecycle stage yields a victim-side mechanism, the DV-Type is Unknown. A doctrinal expectation of protecting classified military networks certainly exists at any armed force, but no source documents an expectation or remedy that this victim knew and failed to act on, so no origin x break answer can be evidenced for any stage.
EuRepoC row carries no receiver_name; the victim is derived from receiver_category (State institutions / political system - Military) and the description, and named descriptively. Victim involvement is itself inferred by the researchers from the C2 domain name marina-info.net (their report says 'speculating' and 'we cannot exclude ... any other subcontractor'), so 'victim established' is false. Disclosure was made solely by the IT-security company (CSE Cybsec Z-Lab, 13-15 July 2018); searches in English, Italian and French (incident name, Marina Militare, Ministero della Difesa, DICIE Relazione 2018, follow-up reporting) found only re-publications of the same technical analysis - no victim statement, regulator or CERT-F Italia notice, parliamentary or legal response; Italy's Relazione 2018 on intelligence notes a general rise of state-linked espionage against Italian institutions in 2018 without naming this incident. Source provenance: the case file's attribution_source_url (vx-underground.org) now sits behind a Cloudflare challenge, and csecybsec.com was unreachable from this container, so the ZLab report and the CSE blog post are cited as the exact web.archive.org snapshots opened and read during this task (report text extracted with pdftotext from the archived PDF). The Register article on the campaign (theregister.co.uk/2018-07-16/apt28_italian_job/) was read during research but returns HTTP 404 to automated clients at check time, so it is not cited; the Security Affairs article republishing the same Z-Lab findings is cited instead. No consent-restricted actions were needed.