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Russian CEC Election-Day DDoS (Unattributed, 2018)

2018 · Russia · O - Public administration and defence · DDoS attack causing short-term disruption

Analysed 2026-11-06 by Hermes

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What happened

DDoS attack causing short-term disruption

Dual vulnerability type

No DV evidenced

Alternative: none defensible

Why this classification

(1) Strategic expectation at the victim: as the body running a national presidential election, the CEC's governing security doctrine separated the crown-jewel control - the State Automated System Vybory vote-counting system - from the global network (its chair publicly stated it is unreachable), while its public web presence served election information on voting day. (2) What happened in practice: in the early hours of election day, 18 March 2018, the CEC website and its information centre were hit by a DDoS attack that the CEC reported as repelled within about three hours (peak at 02:20, traffic from IPs in 15 countries, no attribution); the related Civic Chamber observer website was briefly down and restored the same day; the Interior Ministry confirmed the attacks took place and stated that prior coordinated work by law enforcement, Roskomnadzor and the CEC prevented any breakdown of the vote-counting system; no data theft occurred; the CEC itself disclosed the incident the same day. (3) Why this is No DV evidenced rather than a knowing-doing or doctrinal-material gap: all six lifecycle stages were reviewed and no source documents a victim-side control gap. The one doctrinal control that was decisive - isolation of the counting system - is positively evidenced as realised in the material architecture, and the offline design of the vote was independently corroborated by an outside analyst quoted in Western reporting, so this is a confirmed negative (aligned doctrine and execution) for the control that mattered. Detection was own-monitoring and immediate (the CEC measured the attack window, peak and source countries in real time), mitigation completed within hours, disclosure was self-initiated and same-day, and egress was not in play. The entry vector (volumetric DDoS) is attacker-side and not a victim gap; the brief web disruption is an impact, and no source states why DDoS protection degraded service, so no origin/break answer exists that could place the case in a DV-Type. (4) Conditions the evidence shows, recorded as markers without DV lens: RM32 - election-facing web availability was temporarily degraded under attack (short-term disruption below 24h in the case data; the Civic Chamber observer site briefly down). RM21 - DDoS targeting of CEC web resources recurred across election cycles: FireEye documented low-impact DDoS attacks against the Central Commission's website during the 2015 Russian elections, and the same availability condition reappeared in 2018; the 2018 defence nonetheless held the line at the systems that mattered. No DV-Type is assigned; the record is also one-sided (see Notes).

Risk markers

Sources

Notes

Data quality: eurepoc_extra start_date/end_date is 13.05.2018, but the row's description quotes its RT source article, which reports the DDoS on election day 18 March 2018; no reporting of a CEC DDoS on 13 May 2018 was found in English or Russian searches. The Year is 2018 on either date; the row's described incident (the election-day DDoS from 15 countries) is the one classified. One-sided source: essentially all lifecycle detail (detection metrics, repelled, GAS Vybory isolation, no criminal-case information) comes from CEC, Rostelecom and Interior Ministry officials via Russian state-linked agencies (RT, TASS); Western reporting (Newsweek, SC Media) flagged possible exaggeration or fabrication of the attack, but none reported a victim-side control gap, and no regulator, court or forensic investigation of this incident was found. The 2015 DDoS precedent is per a FireEye report summary (The Voting News); separate later incidents at this victim (further election-cycle DDoS claims in 2024, and a September 2025 attack on CEC online-voting resources claimed by Ukrainian defence intelligence) are distinct events, not part of this row's incident, and were not used as evidence. Link check: rt.com was unreachable at check time (timeout); the page was opened and read during research.