2018 · Israel · O - Public administration and defence · Website defacement and short DDoS disruption wave (hacktivist campaign)
Analysed 2026-11-06 by Hermes
Open this case in the tool →Website defacement and short DDoS disruption wave (hacktivist campaign)
No DV evidenced
Alternative: none defensible
(1) The row describes the 3 April 2018 opening wave of the annual OpIsrael hacktivist campaign: more than a dozen Israeli public websites - municipality sites (Kfar Saba, Eilat, Herzliya, Acre and others), the Hillel Yaffe and Baruch Padeh medical centres, the Israeli Opera, the Israel Teachers Union and the IDF Widows and Orphans Organization - were defaced with a pro-Palestinian message and briefly hit by denial-of-service, apparently in response to IDF-Gaza border clashes the previous weekend; the attacker (self-named DarkCoder/Th3Falcon) disclosed the action himself via Twitter and defacement archives. (2) What the sources establish is impact only: homepages replaced, sites unreachable for a few hours, restoration within 24 hours, no data theft (the dataset records disruption under 24h, intensity 1, data_theft none); the Israel Teachers Union said only that Daronet Internet Solutions, the company that operates and secures its site, was examining the matter. (3) No victim-side mechanism is documented for any of the affected organisations: no root cause of the defacement, no dwell time, no policy, resourcing or disclosure conduct attributable to a named victim. The victim here is also diffuse - at least a dozen separate organisations across municipalities, health, arts and associations - so the origin x break test cannot be answered for any single one. Vendor reporting (Radware) characterises the campaign's methods - commodity tools mass-abusing common CMS installs, defacements that plague unprotected small sites - but that describes the attackers' pattern, and inferring a DV-Type from it would be the rejected attacker-technique reasoning. Per the decision rule, when reporting confirms impact only, the DV-Type is Unknown; the entry vector is undisclosed and not load-bearing here, and no later lifecycle stage is documented beyond restoration within a day.
Diffuse multi-organisation hacktivist campaign: the row's name 'Op Israel 2018' is the operation label, not an organisation; the actual victims are 12+ separate Israeli bodies (municipalities, hospitals, Israeli Opera, Israel Teachers Union, IDF Widows and Orphans Organization). Disclosure was by the attacker (self-attribution via social media), consistent with the eurepoc_extra source_disclosure field. Sector 'O Public administration and defence' chosen because the dataset's first receiver category is 'State institutions / political system / Civil service / administration' and municipalities dominate the victim list; strictly, no single organisation's sector applies to this diffuse row. Attribution rests on attacker self-claims (DarkCoder/Th3Falcon, Anonymous-linked); victim reporting does not confirm identities. A Washington Times article on the same wave could not be opened during research and is not cited. The Hadera hospital ransomware story reported in April 2018 is a separate incident and was not merged into this row. Defacement archives (Zone-H) are referenced only as reported by the cited press; no leak site was visited. Link check: timesofisrael.com blocks automated access (HTTP 403); the page was opened and read during research. Link check: israelhayom.com blocks automated access (HTTP 403); the page was opened and read during research.