2017 · United States · O - Public administration and defence · Cyber-espionage campaign (recruitment-lure spear-phishing, Rising Sun implant)
Analysed 2026-11-06 by Hermes
Open this case in the tool →Cyber-espionage campaign (recruitment-lure spear-phishing, Rising Sun implant)
No DV evidenced
Alternative: none defensible
Unknown (insufficient evidence; atypical, attacker-side state-sponsored espionage campaign). (1) The expectation at a victim can only be stated generically: defense, government, energy, finance and nuclear organisations in the US, UK and Europe are expected to control macro-enabled documents and detect an in-memory implant; no individual victim organisation is named anywhere in the record, so no organisational expectation, decision or resourcing situation is documented for any of them. (2) What the sources show is the attacker's operation, not the victims' lifecycle: McAfee's December 2018 report and blog describe spear-phishing with fake job-recruitment Word documents carrying a malicious macro, an in-memory downloader, the Rising Sun implant (an evolution of the Lazarus backdoor Duuzer) harvesting system data and exfiltrating it over an encrypted channel, with the implant seen in 87 organisations in October-November 2018, predominantly in the United States and mostly defense and government-related; the March 2019 analysis of a government-seized command-and-control server extended the activity to at least September 2017 and strengthened the link to Lazarus. (3) Under the decision rule, Unknown applies when reporting confirms impact only: no lifecycle stage - entry, containment, detection, egress, recovery, response - yields a defensible victim-side mechanism, because none of the 87+ breaches is reported at the level of an organisation's policy, knowledge, decision or architecture. The entry is recruitment-lure macro phishing, but the exclusion condition for social-engineering and endpoint markers requires evidence of the organisational condition (training, verification, filtering) that let it succeed, and no source provides it; coding a marker from attacker tradecraft alone is rejected reasoning. No risk markers are therefore coded. Victim, Country and Year follow the EuRepoC row (receiver country United States, start 01.09.2017), and the September 2017 start matches the C2 server's log evidence; the dataset's own attribution (Lazarus, technical attribution by the IT-security community) is consistent with the record, though McAfee's first report left a false-flag possibility open.
Diffuse state-sponsored campaign row: no single victim organisation exists in the framework's sense, so the victim can only be named descriptively and 'victim established' is false (no individual victim is publicly named). The dataset's since September 2017 matches the March 2019 finding that the C2 framework was active since at least September 2017 (BleepingComputer); McAfee's published observations concern October-November 2018 (87 organisations). The case description's risings unim plant is the Rising Sun implant, and the description itself notes the McAfee report is no longer accessible: the original https://www.mcafee.com/enterprise/en-us/assets/reports/rp-operation-sharpshooter.pdf now redirects to a McAfee consumer page, so the report is cited via the opened web.archive.org snapshot. The third source_url lead (techcrunch.com/2019-03-03/north-korea-lazarus-hackers/) could not be opened during research (404) and is not cited; the same March 2019 C2-server reporting is covered by the cited SecurityWeek-era secondary and BleepingComputer pages. Sector coded O on the dominant target category: McAfee observed the majority of targets were defense and government-related, while the row's receiver list also spans energy, finance and defence industry (multi-sector campaign). Attribution: the December 2018 report deliberately left a false-flag possibility open; the 2019 C2 analysis and the EuRepoC attribution converge on Lazarus.