← Breach analysis by the Dual Vulnerabilities framework

Banks and Bitcoin users fake job-recruitment phishing (Lazarus Group, 2017)

2017 · K - Financial and insurance activities · Spear-phishing with fake job-recruitment lures delivering malware for data theft and Bitcoin wallet targeting

Analysed 2026-11-06 by Hermes

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What happened

Spear-phishing with fake job-recruitment lures delivering malware for data theft and Bitcoin wallet targeting

Dual vulnerability type

No DV evidenced

Alternative: none defensible

Why this classification

(1) The row describes a North Korean state-affiliated campaign: beginning April 2017 Lazarus sent spear-phishing emails posing as job recruiters with malicious Word documents to organisations in finance, defence and cryptocurrency, and in January 2018 revived the tactic (campaign dubbed HaoBao) with documents posing as job descriptions for a multinational bank, aimed at machines running Bitcoin wallet software. (2) All available reporting (McAfee ATR as reported by Dark Reading, and the related 2017 campaign covered by Palo Alto Unit 42 via Bleeping Computer and by Secureworks via CyberScoop) describes only attacker-side activity: the lure, the macro-enabling trick, the crypto-scanner implant and the infrastructure overlap. No victim organisation is ever named; Dark Reading reports explicitly that the targets are unknown, and the EuRepoC row itself lists receiver country as Unknown. (3) The DV framework assesses a victim organisation's situation across its lifecycle (entry, containment, detection, egress, recovery, response). Here no lifecycle stage yields a defensible victim-side mechanism for any identified organisation: the only fact at the 'victim' side is that unspecified recipients opened documents and were tricked into enabling content, and no source documents any named organisation's awareness programme, verification procedure, monitoring or governance - so neither the doctrinal/material origin nor the leadership/execution break can be answered for any stage. The condition shown (users deceived by recruiter-themed lures) superficially resembles RM24, but its exclusion clause requires showing the organisational condition that let the deception succeed, which the diffuse-population reporting never does; per the method the condition is described here, not coded. This is an atypical, attacker-side state criminality operation against an unnamed population: DV-Type Unknown, atypical nature flagged in Notes; the attacker's TTP pattern is context only, never a basis for a DV-Type.

Sources

Notes

Atypical case: state-affiliated financially motivated campaign against a diffuse, unnamed population ('endusers'); no single victim organisation exists in the record, so the DV framework has no victim situation to assess - Unknown per the decision rule. EuRepoC receiver_country is 'Unknown', receiver subcategories Finance and Defence industry; source_disclosure: incident disclosed by IT-security company (McAfee ATR), attribution by the IT-security community. Dataset source_url (securingtomorrow.mcafee.com HaoBao report) could not be opened from this host (HTTP error via fetch, Akamai block, and web.archive.org refused automated access); the campaign details rest on secondary articles actually opened: Dark Reading (reporting the McAfee ATR HaoBao report), Bleeping Computer (Palo Alto Unit 42 on the 2017 fake-recruiter wave against US defence contractors) and CyberScoop (Secureworks/Kaspersky on the December 2017 crypto-company job lure). Sector: dataset lists Finance as the first receiver subcategory, so the multi-target row is coded to the financial section; this is a data-quality caveat, not a single-organisation classification. No legal or political response fields in the case file; nothing required consent in this unattended run.